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This paper  addresses  a central  question  in trade  and development  economics:  does in-
creased exposure  to foreign  competition generate  gains in industrial  productivity?  Focusing
on  the case  of Colombia,  we  find that  it  does.  A  panel  of manufacturing  plants between
1977 and  1991 is used to investigate the link between trade policy and plant-level  productiv-
ity.  During  these fifteen  years,  trade policy  exhibited  significant  variation,  with periods of
trade  liberalization  alternating with periods of increased  trade protection.  Moreover,  these
changes in protection  differed  substantially  across industries.
The empirical  literature  on  the impact  of trade  liberalization  on productivity  provides
some, but not definitive,  evidence of a positive  effect  of trade liberalization  on productivity
levels and growth following three approaches.  First; the macro-level approach utilizes  cross-
country  growth  regressions,  associating  output growth  with an aggregate  measure  of trade
openness.'  Using measures  of outward policy  orientation  across  countries and over  time is
plagued by difficulties  (see, e.g.,  Pritchett,  1996;  Rodrik and Rodriguez,  2001).  Furthermore,
an aggregate measure of openness to trade cannot capture the differential  incentives provided
by trade protection  to different  industries.
Second,  the industry-level  approach  considers cross-industry  regressions  of Solow  (1957)
residual  total factor  productivity  (TFP)  growth  on  trade  policy  variables  or  on  demand
growth  due  to export  expansion  and  import  substitution.2 Having  a single  productivity
measure  per industry, -however, ignores  cross-plant heterogeneity,  a stylized  finding for  de-
veloped  and  developing  countries,  which  is  useful  to fully  investigate  the impact  of trade
policy on productivity.
Finally, the micro-level approach  uses regressions  of either (i) firm output growth derived
in a Solow framework  on an  indicator  variable for  the period  of trade  reform,  or  (ii)  plant
TFP  measures  on trade  orientation  in  the  plant's  industry.  Harrison  (1994)  and Krishna
and  Mitra  (1998)  estimate  the  former  for  firms  in  Cote  d'Ivoire  and  India,  respectively.
However,  the coefficient  on the indicator variable for the trade reform period cannot  isolate
the corresponding productivity gains since it also captures contemporaneous  macroeconomic
shocks.  Moreover,  it ignores the variation  in protection  across industries.  Pavcnik  (2002)
1 See,  for example,  Dollar  (1992),  Edwards  (1993,  1998),  Harrison  (1996),  Levine and Renelt  (1992),  Sachs
and Warner  (1995),  and the references therein.
2 For example,  Nishimizu  and  Robinson  (1984)  use  export  expansion  and  import  substitution,  while  Kim
(2000)  and Lee  (1995)  use trade policy variables.  See Rodrik  (1995)  for a survey.estimates the latter,  identifying  the  effect  of trade reform in Chile from the comparison  of
consistent  TFP measures  of plants in import-competing  and export-oriented, industries to
those of plants in nontraded industries over time as trade reform proceeds.3
Our  study  contributes  to the  micro-level  approach  by  examining  the  impact  of trade
policy on Colombian  plant productivity  following  a two-stage estimation  procedure.  In the
first  stage,  we  obtain  new  time-varying  measures  of plant  productivity  applying  an  esti-
mation  method  that addresses  a fundamental  simultaneity  problem.  The  use of ordinary
least squares  (OLS)  for  production  function estimation  assumes  that regressors  such as la-
bor are treated  as  exogenous variables.  However,  input choices are  endogenous, depending
for example on managerial  ability known to the plant's decision-maker,  but unknown to the
researcher.  Since input choices and productivity are correlated,  OLS estimates suffer from a
simultaneity  bias.4 Our methodology  for production function  estimation  follows Levinsohn
and Petrin  (2001).  Under general conditions,  a plant's demand  for raw  materials increases
monotonically with productivity,  conditional  on its capital stock.  Hence, we use a nonpara-
metric estimate for the inverse raw materials demand function as the control for unobservable
productivity to correct for the simultaneity  bias.
In the second stage, we estimate the link between trade policy and plant productivity in a
regression framework, relying on measures that exhibit significant variation across industries
and  over time,  rather  than  on a single change  in trade  regime  as in  previous studies.  We
focus on nominal tariffs since  they are direct  price measures  of trade barriers  reflecting the
degree  of government  intervention  and the changes  in trade  regime.  Harrison  (1996)  and
Rodrik  and Rodriguez  (2001)  argue  that  the  use  of tariffs,  instead  of indicator  variables
for the liberalization  period,  is more useful to precisely  identify the impact of trade policy
on productivity.  However,  trade policy  (e.g.,  tariffs)  is  subject to a potential  endogeneity
problem:  the government  may  raise  current  trade  policy  barriers  in response  to lobbying
by  firms  in  industries  with relatively  low  productivity.  We  address  this  problem  in our
estimation  by  (i)  considering  lagged trade  policy  measures,  (ii) controlling  for unobserved
3  Pavcnik  also  considers  import  penetration  and  an  average  tariff  in a  sub-period  of  her  main  sample.
However,  since tariffs  are uniform  across Chilean industries,  they  are equivalent  to year effects.  Hence,  her
analysis cannot  exploit  the variation  in trade policy  across  industries,  which is the most  appealing feature
of the Colombian  case.
4 This bias was initially  discussed  by Marschak  and Andrews  (1944).  See Griliches  and Mairesse  (1995)  for
a comprehensive  survey.  Variable  inputs,  which  are  easier  to  adjust,  tend  to have  upwardly  biased  OLS
coefficient  estimates.  But with more than  two inputs,  not all  biases can  be exactly  signed,  as they  depend
upon the degree of correlation  between  each input  and the productivity shock.
2industry  fixed characteristics,  and  (iii)  examining  the  economic rationales  underlying trade
policy determination in Colombia.
The main findings of this paper  are as  follows.  First, our production  function estimates
reveal the importance of correcting for the endogeneity  of input choices with respect  to pro-
ductivity  across industries.  Second,  we  provide strong  evidence  supporting the hypothesis
that Colombian plants' productivity is negatively affected by trade protection.  Lagged nom-
inal tariffs have an economically and statistically  significant negative impact on productivity,
even after  controlling for, plant characteristics,  for industry heterogeneity,  and for variation
in the real exchange rate (RER).  Changes in Colombian tariffs during the sample period are
a response to fiscal and external imbalances, which suggests that the negative impact  of tar-
iffs does not reflect causality running  from productivity to trade policy.  Third, the negative
impact of tariffs is not driven by the exit of less productive  plants under trade liberalization,
rather it reflects within-plant  productivity gains.  We provide  evidence suggesting that these
gains  are associated with an increase in (i)  skilled labor intensity of production,  (ii) imports
of intermediate  inputs,  and  (iii)  investments  in  machinery  at  the plant  level.  Fourth,  we
allow for heterogeneity  in the impact  of trade policy on productivity  according to plant size
and find that the negative impact  of tariffs on productivity  is stronger for larger  plants.  To
the best of our  knowledge,  this finding has not been previously  provided  in the literature.
Finally,  we introduce cross-industry  heterogeneity  in the impact of trade policy  on produc-
tivity and estimate a stronger negative impact of tariffs for plants in industries with a lower
degree of domestic  competition.  Our main findings are robust to the use of effective  rates of
protection  (ERP)  and import penetration ratios as measures of trade protection.
Trade  liberalization  may  affect  plant  productivity  through  several  mechanisms.  First,
as  imports  expand,  the  ensuing competitive  pressure  results  in  higher  productivity  if do-
mestic firms  eliminate X-inefficiency  or slack and use inputs more  efficiently.5 In contrast,
infant-industry arguments  sustain  that selected  protection  allows for  productivity  gains  in
industries  where  learning-by-doing  is  important.  Second,  trade  liberalization  may  boost
plant  productivity  by  allowing for  an  increased  access  to imported intermediate  inputs of
5 Vousden and Campbell (1994)  examine the efficiency of a firm with internal informational  asymmetries  and
show that trade protection  induces slack,  by reducing competition.  Extending the technology ladder model
in  Grossman  and Helpman  (1991b),  Holmes  and Schmitz  (2001)  show  that  for an  entrepreneur,  lowering
the tariffs  protecting his/her  industry  makes  it less attractive  to engage  in nonproductive  activities  (wast-
ing efforts  blocking competitors'  potential  innovations)  and more attractive  to pursue  productive  activities
(engaging  in research).
3higher quality and/or broader variety (e.g.,  Grossman and Helpman,  1991a),  through export
activities,  the  exposure  to  technologies  embodied  in  imported  final  goods  and the  access
to  imported  capital  goods  corresponding  to technologies  that were  previously  unavailable.
Third,  trade liberalization  may influence the incentives to invest in technological innovation.
In fact,  Colombian government  agencies attribute weak industrial  productivity  in the early
1980s to existing trade protection  mechanisms that reduced  those incentives  (Zerda,  1992).
Goh  (2000)  focuses  on the opportunity cost of technological  effort  (the foregone profits due
to  the  delay  in  the  commercialization  of output)  and  shows  that trade  liberalization  in-
creases  a firm's  incentives  to engage  in productivity-enhancing  technological  effort  since it
reduces  its profits  for any  productivity  level.  In  contrast,  Rodrik  (1991)  and Traga  (1997)
find that  lower trade  protection or higher  import  competition  reduce  a firm's  investments
in productivity-enhancing  technological  upgrading,  when the incentives to invest depend on
the firm's  output  or  market  share  reduced  by  trade  liberalization.  In  sum,  the  theoreti-
cal  literature  delivers  some  disparate  predictions:  trade  liberalization  may  result  in either
productivity gains or losses.6 Hence,  empirical  evidence is essential to inform the debate.
This paper  is organized as follows.  In Section  2,  we present  the empirical  methodology.
In Section  3, we describe the data.  In Section  4,  the production  function  and productivity
estimates  are  presented.  In  Section  5,  we  estimate  the  impact  of trade  policy  on  plant
productivity.  In Sections  6 and  7,  we  examine  the differential  impact  of trade  policy on
productivity  according to plant size and to the degree of domestic competition in the industry,
respectively.  Section 8  concludes.
2.  Empirical Methodology
We  estimate  consistent  production  function  estimates  combining  parametric  and  non-
parametric  techniques  as in  Levinsohn  and Petrin  (2001).  This methodology  builds upon
that proposed  by  Olley  and Pakes  (1996),  where  investment  corrects  for  the simultaneity
bias resulting  from  the correlation  between  plants' input choices  and privately  known  pro-
ductivity, but  is more suitable for  developing countries'  datasets.  A  technical condition  for
Olley  and  Pakes'  methodology  - investment  is a monotonic  function of productivity  con-
ditional  on capital  - is verified  only  for plants  with positive  investment  (Pakes,  1994).  In
6 The  exploitation  of scale  economies  is  another  mechanism  by  which  trade  liberalization  could  lead  to
productivity  gains.  In our framework,  we capture  intra-plant  gains unrelated to scale  economies  since these
are embodied in the production function  coefficients  and productivity  estimates.
4Colombia, small -plants invest infrequently,  so they would be systematically eliminated  from
the estimating sample.  Using investment  to correct  for simultaneity  would  in fact result  in
biased production function estimates and possibly unrealistic annual variability in estimated
plant productivity.  In our estimation  procedure,  we  use raw materials to control  for the si-
multaneity  bias.7 Our dataset allows us to precisely  measure raw  materials  u-sage  (hereafter
simply 'raw materials') that is easily adjustable  to productivity  shocks.'
We assume that a plant decision-maker maximizes expected profits from a Cobb-Douglas
production  function  under  uncertainty.  Plant-level  heterogeneity  is  allowed  in  the form of
plant specific productivity shocks.  The timing of decisions  of plant i in industry j  in year t is
as follows.  The decision-maker  initially observes current  productivity w tt  and then  chooses
variable  inputs labor  Q  ., raw  materials  mij and  energy  e i to be combined  with the quasi-
fixed input capital kit  for production of output yj . We  assume that plants' decision-makers
decide whether  or not to exit the industry before observing  w,.  The  unbalanced  nature  of
our panel dataset  (described in Section 3)  controls in part for  the selection  bias that arises
if this assumption does not exactly hold in our sample.  The estimating  equation for plant  i
in industry j  in year t is as follows  (with output and inputs in logarithms):9
Yi=  a +  f3 11l  +  3ee 3 +  Pmmmit  +  Okki3k  +  w,i  +  eJ,  (1)
where w i, privately known to the decision-maker  and correlated with1 3', e,3,  and mj3  gener-
ates the simultaneity  bias and  iti,  unknown to the decision-maker,  represents  unpredictable
mean-zero shocks to productivity realized after input choices are made.  A set of production
function  parameters  is obtained  for  each  industry  j  to  allow  for  technological  differences
across industries.
The  plant's  variable  input  demands  derived  from profit  maximization  depend  on cap-
7 The simultaneity  bias could  also be addressed  by fixed plant effects  estimation.  However,  doing so would
impose  the particularly restrictive  assumption  of no  dynamics  in plant  productivity.  Alternatively,  instru-
mental  variables  (IV)  estimation  would  correct  for  simultaneity  but  would  require  the  use  of  plant-level
instruments  correlated  with input  choices  and uncorrelated  with productivity,  such  as input  prices,  which
are  not reported  for Colombian  plants.  Lagged  inputs  cannot  serve as  instruments,  since  our framework
allows  for serial correlation  in plant  productivity.
8 Raw  materials  usage  is measured  as purchases  of raw  materials  plus  the  net  change  in  inventories.  By
accounting  for changes  in inventories,  this measure  captures the current  demand for raw  materials  that is
undoubtedly  correlated with current  productivity.  Furthermore,  most plants  report  positive raw  materials
usage in all years (a requirement to belong to the estimating sample),  whereas that is  less  prevalent for other
intermediate  inputs.
9  We choose an output  over a value-added  specification  since the separability  of the production technology
in intermediate  inputs, required  for value-added to be a valid production index,  is not verified for our data.
Within industries,  the ratio of intermediate inputs to output exhibits  high variability.
5ital  and  on  privately  known  productivity.  We  invert  the  raw  materials  demand  function
m  =mt (w  , kiJ)  to obtain a productivity  function imposing the following  monotonicity  as-
sumption:  conditional on capital, the demand for raw materials increases with productivity.10
The productivity  function wit  =  i/t(mj,  kij) depends only on observable  variables.  Eq.  (1)
can be rewritten in the partially linear  form (hereafter  omitting industry superscript  j):
Yit =  'llit  +  0 3eeit  +  (t (mit, kit)  +  cit,  (2)
where
(t (mit, kit)  = a  +  /3mmit +  fkkit +  Wt (mit, kit).
Since E[eit  I mit, kit]  = 0, the difference  between Eq.  (2)  and its expectation,  conditional  on
raw materials  and capital is given  by:
yit - Et yit  I mit, kit] = 81(lit - E[ lit  mit, kit])  +  8,(eit - Et eit I mit, kit ]) +  eit.  (3)
Eq.  (3)  is  estimated  by OLS  (with  no constant  term)  to obtain  consistent  parameter  esti-
mates for  the variable  inputs that  do  not  correct  for simultaneity,  labor  and  energy.  The
conditional expectations  are obtained  by locally weighted  least squares  (LWLS)  regressions
of output,  labor and energy  on (rnit,  kit) .
Cycles in  Colombian  manufacturing  output  growth  affect  input demands  through,  e.g.,
variation  in the ratios of input  to output  prices.  While the raw materials  demand function
does not explicitly depend on plant-level input and output prices, it is allowed to differ across
two periods:  (i)  1977-1983,  a period of slow output growth,  and  (ii)  1984-1991,  a period  of
faster output growth." 2 Consequently,  the productivity function wt(.)  and the function  t (.)
also differ across two periods.  In particular,  qt (.) is obtained from a LWLS regression of (yit
- 3llit - /eeit)  on (mit, kit)  estimated separately across the two periods.
To  estimate  (0m,13k)  consistently,  we  assume  that  productivity  follows  a  first  order
Markov  process  as  in,  e.g.,  Hopenhayn  and Rogerson  (1993)  and  Olley and Pakes  (1996):
'OA  sufficient  (but not necessary)  condition  for this monotonicity  assumption to hold is perfect competition
in  input  and output  markets.  The estimation  is also valid  under  some types  of imperfect  competition  in
output markets  (e.g.,  Cournot oligopoly with linear demand functions  (Levinsohn and Petrin,  2001)).  Note
that the raw materials  demand function is industry-specific,  not plant-specific.
IlFor  example  in  the  case  of output,  we  estimate  a  weighted  linear  regression  of  Yit  on  a second  order
polynomial  in  (mit, kit)  using data in  the neighborhood  of a data point (mit, kit).  The intercept  from this
regression  is  an estimate  for the  expected  value of Yit  conditional  on  (miit, kit).  See  Fernandes  (2002)  for
further details. .
l2For  brevity,  a t subscript  indexes  mt(.), wt(.),  Ot(.).  However,  these  functions  are allowed  to differ  only
across the two periods, not across years.  Also,  note that the break years for the productivity  function wt(.)
differ from the break years for the trade regimes later described  in Section 3.2.
6Wit  =  E[wit I Wit-,]  +  (it,  where (it,  the unexpected productivity  shock, is independent  and
identically  distributed.  Our  estimation strategy  is based  on the identification  assumption
that capital may adjust to expected  productivity but does not adjust to the unexpected pro-
ductivity  shock.  The following  moment  conditions  are  obtained  by taking  the expectation
of Eq.  (1)  conditional  on,  respectively,  capital and lagged  raw materials, and replacing  wit
by its Markov process:
E[yit - 0I 3 lit  - eit  - 0  m.Mit  - fkkit - E[wit  I Wit-,]  I kit]=E[eit + (it  I kit] = 0,  (4)
E[yit  - #,lit  - feit - smMit  - Okkit  - E[wit I  wit-l]  I mit-,]=E[eit  +  (it  I mit-1]  =  0.  (5)
Since  E[cit  I kit]  = 0,  Eq.  (4)  indicates  that  capital  in year  t  is  uncorrelated  with  the
unexpected  productivity  shock  in year  t.  Given  that  E[eit  I mit-1]  = 0,  Eq.  (5) indicates
that raw  materials  in year t - 1 is uncorrelated  with the unexpected  productivity  shock  in
year t.0 3 The residuals  +it  6t are obtained using the estimated  coefficients  (:1X  13e)) some
initial  values  (,8*,  0k),  and a  non-parametric  estimate  for  expected  productivity  E[wit
witA. 4  A generalized method of moments (GMM)  criterion function weights the plant-year
moment  conditions  by their  variance-covariance  matrix.  The estimation  algorithm  starts
from initial  OLS  estimates,  iterates  on  the  sample  moment  conditions  to  match them  to
their theoretical  value of zero,  and then reaches final parameter  estimates."5 The standard
errors for the parameter estimates are bootstrapped.16
The plant-level  Hicks-neutral TFP residual is defined  as PTit  =  Wit + eit and represents
the efficiency in transforming inputs into output, through learning-by-doing,  adopting newer
and better  methods  of production,  improvements  in managerial  practices,  worker  training,
among  others.  It  may incorporate  unobservable  changes  in factor  utilization,  since  costs
rise when  plants operate  below  capacity.  In fact,  the use  of raw materials  to correct  for
simultaneity  parallels  its use to correct  for unobserved  variation  in factor  utilization  (e.g.,
1 3Eq.  (5)  identifies the parameter  /3  since mi*t-  and mit  are correlated under the Markov  structure.
14This  estimate  is obtained  as a LWVLS  regression  of (wit + eit) *  it - 6  -it  - /eeit  - -*mit  - Pkkit  on
Witl=  (mit-1, kit-,) - /3mmit-I  - 6*kit-l  Note that the parameter  Ca  cannot be separately identified
from the estimated E[wit  I wit-ij.
15A derivative optimization routme is complemented  by a  grid search,  given the existence  of multiple local
minima  for the GMM  criterion  function in some  industries.  The  minimizers  resulting from grid search  are
used  as starting values in the  derivative  optimization  routine  to reach  more precise  (Pm,  63k)  values.
1 6For any industry, our bootstrap procedure  consists of sampling randomly with replacement plants from the
dataset, matching in any year the number of plants in the original sample.  Each plant is taken as a block  if
it is randomly selected  (i.e.,  all its observations  are included in the bootstrap sample),  since the estimation
requires  the use  of lagged  inputs.  We  obtain estimates  (/3,/3e,/3m,/3k)  for  100 different  bootstrap samples.
The standard  deviation of a parameter estimate  across bootstrap samples constitutes  its standard error.
'7Basu,  1996).  Considering this broader concept of productivity  is useful to examine  whether
plant  productivity  is  affected  by trade  policy.  Using  the  consistent  production  function
coefficients,  plant TFP  is  estimated  by Arit =  Yit  - Bljt  - I3eeit  - /3mmit - ,Bkklt.  This TFP
measure is associated with a particular industry's technology,  so it is not comparable across
industries.  We follow Aw,  Chen and Roberts  (2001)  and Pavcnik  (2002) to obtain a relative
TFP measure, comparable across years and industries.  For each plant in an industry, relative
TFP is the difference between the plant's estimated TFP and the TFP of an average plant in
the industry in 1977 (obtained  combining average logarithmic output and inputs in 1977 with
the estimated production coefficients).  Hereafter,  prit denotes the relative TFP measure.
Our analysis of the impact of trade policy on plant productivity is based on the following
specification  that pools plants across  all industries and years:
prit  = 10  +-At  +  31TP  t3L 1 + (3 2)'Xitl  + I  +u it  (6)
where  At  is an indicator variable for sample years, TPti'1 is a measure of lagged trade protec-
tion, Xj is a matrix of plant characteristics affecting productivity,  I i is an indicator variable
for the plant's 3 or 4-digit industry and u12  represents other omitted factors influencing pro-
ductivity.  Part of the heterogeneity  in plant productivity  is deliberately  left unexplained in
Eq.  (6),  as our interest  lies in a specific  factor affecting  productivity:  trade protection.  Note
that ,i3 is negative if trade liberalization  is associated with an increase  in plant productivity.
3.  Data:  Production and Trade Policy
3.1.  Production Variables
This paper  uses plant-level  panel data from  the  Colombian  Manufacturing  census  pro-
vided  by DANE  (National  Statistical  Institute)  for  the  years  1977  through  1991.  Plants
with  less  than  10  employees  are:  (i)  included  in  the census  in  1977-1982,  (ii)  excluded  in
1983-1984,  and  (iii)  included  as a small  proportion  after  1985.17  The  census covers  exten-
sively formal  industrial  production  in  all  3-digit  ISIC  (revision  2)  industries  in Colombia.
'7The  census  does  not  indicate  whether  a plant  is a single-plant  firm or belongs to a multi-plant  firm.  It
is unlikely,  however, that this biases the estimated effect of trade liberalization  on productivity.  If, for  cost
efficiency purposes  under  liberalization,  firms replace  less productive plants  by more productive new plants
keeping the same identification number in the census,  then a positive  effect  of liberalization  on productivity
would be largely  due to the exit of less productive plants.  This is not a concern for our study since  DANE
registers any new plant with a new identification  number.  Also, if plants belonging to industrial groups have
better access  to domestic  and especially  to imported inputs,  they may derive less productivity  gains  from
liberalization,  but that  does not bias  the estimated effect  of liberalization.
8The unbalanced  nature of the panel  allows  the identification  of entering  and exiting plants
each year.  For  each plant  and  year,  the  survey  collects data on production  and sales rev-
enues,  value  added,  input  use (labor  categories,  raw  materials,  electricity  and fuels  which
are aggregated  into an energy input),  inventories  of output and raw materials, investments
(buildings,  machinery,  transportation,  office,  land),  exports  (1981-1991),  3 and 4-digit  ISIC
industry code and year of start-up operations."8 Some plants in the original sample (102,911
observations)  are eliminated  due to, e.g.,  incomplete series,  zero values  for output or inputs,
clear reporting errors, or an ambiguous industrial classification.  The final sample has 97,107
observations  corresponding  to an average of 6,474 plants per year.
A large  degree  of plant heterogeneity  is found  in size,  location,  age, output  and  inputs.
Standard  deviations of output and inputs across plants are more than twice the size of means
in  all  industries.  The distribution  of  plant  size  is  relatively  stable  over  time,  with plants
with less than 50 employees  representing more than 70%  of manufacturing  in any year.  The
median plant  age  increases  from 10 years in  1977 to 14 years in  1991.  The major industries
are  food,  apparel,  textiles,  printing,  nonmetallic  minerals  and  metal  products.  While  the
distribution of plants across industries is relatively stable over time, a large number of plants
enter  into and exit from the various  industries.  Average  annual  entry and exit rates  in our
sample are 11.4% and 9.8%,  respectively.  Nevertheless,  entrant  and exiting plants represent
a small percentage  of total output and are much smaller than incumbents.
3.2.  Trade Regimes in Colombia
From  1977  to 1991,  Colombian  trade  policy  underwent significant  swings,  making  it an
interesting  case to identify the adjustment  of plant productivity to changes  in protection.'9
Three trade regimes  can be clearly  identified:
(i) First liberalization period (1977-1981):  the government  liberalized  import  barriers  by
lowering  tariffs  and increasing  the proportion  of items under  the  free import  regime,  as  a
response  to  exchange  rate  pressures  from  an increase  in  world  coffee  prices,  high  foreign
'8Capital  stock  measures  are  constructed  by  the perpetual  inventory  method  for  each  plant  and  the  five
types of capital.  Nominal variables  in current  pesos  are converted to 1980  pesos by the corresponding  price
deflator.  Specific  price  indexes  from  the Colombian  Central  Bank  are  used to  deflate the  different  types
of capital  and  intermediate  inputs.  We  thank  Mark  Roberts  at  Pennsylvania  State  Univ.  for  providing
output price indexes at the 3digit ISIC level  used to deflate plants' nominal  sales (adjusted  for changes in
inventories)  and generate  a measure  of output.  This procedure  has  some limitations  (Klette and  Griliches,
1996)  but  has been  widely used in previous studies in the absence  of plant-specific  price data.
I9See Garay  (1991),  Garcia  (1991),  GATT  (1990)  and World  Bank (1984,  1989,  1991).
9borrowing and illegal  drug trade.
(ii)  Protection  period (1982-1984):  trade restrictions  were significantly increased.  All tariffs
increased three times, most items were transferred to the prior-licensing list and some imports
were prohibited.  A strong real exchange  appreciation that hurt producers  in traded sectors
and a world  recession motivated  this increase in protection.
(iii) Second liberalization  period (1985-1991):  a gradual shift to trade liberalization occurred.
Initially,  the major  goal was the administrative  rationalization  of the structure  controlling
imports.  Subsequently,  significant reductions in tariff rates and dispersion were pursued and
unrestricted tariff items  represented an increasing fraction of total imports.
During the entire sample  period,  protection  was  characterized  by a large  dispersion  in
tariff levels and a cascading structure:  lower tariffs on raw materials and intermediate inputs
not  produced  domestically  (e.g.,  industrial  chemicals  and  nonferrous  metals)  and  higher
tariffs on consumer and finished products produced domestically (e.g., apparel and furniture).
Also,  an  import  licensing  system  was in  place,  whereby  each  item  in the tariff  code  was
classified into a free-import,  a prior-licensing,  or a prohibited  import list.
3.3.  Measures  of  Trade Protection
A challenge  to an  examination  of the link  between trade protection and productivity is
that trade protection cannot  be described  by a single  measure.  We consider three different
measures of trade protection.20 Tariffs and ERP reflect the degree of government intervention
and  protection  at  the  industry-level.  Volume  measures  such  as  import  penetration  and
export  orientation reflect  how important  foreign  consumers  and producers  are to domestic
producers.  In the  case of Colombia,  the different  measures  are  consistent  in indicating the
relative openness  of industries and the evolution of protection over time.  For  example, high
tariffs  and ERP are  associated  with  low import penetration  into  3  and  4-digit  industries.
Also,  the levels and changes  of 3-digit tariffs  and ERP are highly correlated.
Table  1 shows  the  average  nominal  tariffs  for  3-digit  industries  across  the three  trade
2OTariff  levels  at 3 and  4-digit ISIC  levels  were  obtained from  Jorge  Garcia  at the  World  Bank  and  from
DNP  (National Planning Department).  In two of the common years across  these sources, the value of tariffs
differs,  but  the differences  are negligible,  except  for printing  and transport  equipment.  ERP  at the 3-digit
ISIC level  were obtained  from DNP calculated  according  to the Corden  (1966)  formula  (i.e.,  from the tariff
on the  final  good  a weighted  average  of tariffs  on inputs  is subtracted  where  the  weights  are  taken  from
an  input-output  matrix for Andean  countries  in  1982).  Imports and  exports  at  3 and  4-digit  levels  were
obtained  from Jorge  Garcia.  Coverage  of domestic  production  by  import licenses  was  obtained  from  the
World Bank.  The correlations  across  measures  are presented in Fernandes  (2002).
10regimes.  For most  industries,  a sharp  increase  in tariffs from the first liberalization  period
to the protection period is followed  by a decline in the second liberalization  period.  Broad
trends  in trade orientation  across industries  are presented  in Table  2.  For most industries,
import penetration  decreases  between  1980 and  1985 and increases  between  1985  and  1991
(though  less than expected  given  a strong depreciation  in 1985-1988).  Export  orientation
declines  between  1980  and  1984,  under  increased  protection and  RER  appreciation,  then
increases between  1984 and  1991.21
4.  Production Function and Productivity  Results
The results from the nonparametric/GMM  production  function estimation are presented
in Table  3 and Figure 1.22  Observe that our parameter estimates  are reasonable  relative to
previous  studies.  The variable inputs'  coefficients  are precisely  estimated  at the  1%  con-
fidence  level  in  most  industries,  even  though  bootstrapped  standard  errors  are very  high
when compared  to those obtained  using  OLS.  The use of estimated  regressors  at different
stages  of the procedure  increases the final coefficients'  variability.  The coefficient  on capital
is significant  in the major industries.  Also,  we cannot  reject  the hypothesis  that nonpara-
metric/GMM  estimates exhibit constant returns to scale in most industries.
If more labor is hired and more energy is consumed  in periods of high productivity, OLS
estimates for variable inputs' coefficients  are upwardly biased.  Figure 1 depicts the relation-
ship  between  OLS  and nonparametric/GMM  coefficients  for  all inputs  and industries and
the 45  degree line.  Figures  la, b and  c indicate that in most industries,  the OLS coefficients
on labor, energy and raw materials are upwardly biased relative to those from nonparamet-
ric/GMM  estimation.  If capital  is correlated with lagged or expected productivity,  then an
2lLicenses limiting the imports of items across tariff lines are another important measure  of trade protection
in  Colombia.  They would ideally be  measured  by tariff or price equivalents.  Unfortunately,  only  data for
coverage  ratios of domestic  production  is available  for  a single year,  indicating the percentage  of domestic
production  for which competing imports are subject  to licensing restrictions.  But these ratios  do not show
which  licenses are truly binding and which are issued automatically.  In 1989, coverage  ratios, tariff and ERP
levels are highly  correlated.  Tariffs place a minimum bound on the protection of items for which licenses are
the binding constraint.  Also,  Colombian tariffs are higher for the items also subject to import licenses (World
Bank,  1989,  1991).  Given this positive correlation,  it is possible that  the impact  of tariffs on productivity  in
Section  5 is overestimated,  as it picks up also the  impact  of the omitted licenses.
22The production functions are estimated at a slightly modified 3-digit industry level.  In the original sample,
less than 1%  of plants belong to different 3-digit  industries  across years.  All of a plant's observations  enter
estimation for one industry.  So,  we reclassify  plants into the industry to which they belong in a majority of
years and eliminate the few plants  for which no majority  industry is found.  Food plus food-miscellaneous,
textiles  plus apparel,  wood  products  plus furniture  are considered  as three  industries for estimation,  since
many plants belong an  equal number of years  to the two industries  in the pair.  Moreover,  the technologies
of the two industries  in those pairs are  sufficiently similar.upward  bias in  its OLS coefficient  is  possible.  However,  if capital is  uncorrelated  with ex-
pected productivity but is positively correlated  with variable inputs,  then a negative  bias in
the  OLS capital coefficient  could result.  In fact,  the correlations  between  capital and labor,
materials and energy are positive and significant for all industries.  Figure ld shows that the
OLS coefficient  on capital is higher than that from-nonparametric/GMM  estimation in half
of the industries.
As a robustness check, we use Olley and Pakes' techniques with raw materials, rather than
investment,  correcting for simultaneity to obtain production  function coefficients that do not
differ much from  those in Table  3 (see  Fernandes,  2002).  Also,  the trade and  productivity
literature  has  often  relied  upon  Solow TFP  residuals,  assuming  that  the  contribution  of
an input to output  is  equal  to its share  in  total revenue.  So,  it  is  interesting  to compare
our coefficients  to average  and median input  revenue  shares  in Table  3.  Labor  and energy
revenue shares are lower than the corresponding coefficients  in most industries, whereas the
opposite is true for capital revenue  shares.  Raw materials'  revenue shares are lower than the
coefficients  in half of the industries.  Overall,  using Solow residual TFP measures could bias
the estimated link between  trade policy and plant  produictivity.2 1
For each plant, we obtain the relative TFP measure prit and privately known productivity
Sit=  4t (mit, kit)  - kkit  - .. mmit.  The correlation  between these measures  is  positive  and
significant, with coefficients  ranging from 0.61 for ceramics to 0.93 for petroleum derivatives.
A decomposition  of the variance  of TFP within  industries indicates that the main source of
cross-plant  variation in TFP is variation in privately known productivity.
Across  industries,  TFP  levels  (obtained  as  output-share  weighted  sums  of  plant-level
productivities)  and growth rates are generally  procyclical  relative  to manufacturing  output
growth  and  exhibit  significant  heterogeneity.  Also,  there  is evidence  of intra-industry  het-
erogeneity:  at any point in  time,  some plants'  TFP evolves  differently  from industry TFP,
which stresses the importance  of using  disaggregated  data for an accurate  analysis  of trade
and productivity.
23We  also  compare  our  coefficients  to  those  obtained  from  plant  fixed  effects  estimation.  Fixed  effects
coefficients  on  labor,  energy and  raw  materials  are smaller than  nonparametric/GMM  coefficients  in  most
industries,  whereas  the coefficients  on capital  are  larger than  nonparametric/GMM  coefficients  in half the
industries.  These  results  are  expected,  since  downward  biases  due  to  measurement  error  in  inputs  are
exacerbated  with estimates obtained from within-plant  variation in output and inputs.  As a final robustness
check,  we  use  electricity  to  correct  for  simultaneity  in  the  nonparametric/GMM  estimation  and  obtain
coefficients  relatively  close in magnitude  to those in Table 3.
125.  Productivity  and Trade Policy
5.1.  Average Impact of Tariffs
In this section  we  examine  the  effect of tariffs  on plant  productivity.  The results  from
estimating  Eq.  (6)  are presented  in  Table  4 for  OLS  estimation  with robust  standard  er-
rors (White correction  for heteroskedasticity)  clustered  by plant and for plant fixed  effects
estimation.24 We  include  plant  age in  Xi,,  allowing  it to have  a non-linear  effect  on pro-
ductivity  (see  Campbell,  1998;  Jensen,  McGuckin  and Stiroh,  2001;  Power, 1998).  Through
year  effects, we control for  shocks (e.g.,  macroeconomic  cycles)  affecting equally plant pro-
ductivity  in all industries.  The coefficient of interest  61  is negative  and precisely  estimated
at the  1% confidence  level in  columns  (2)-(3)  and (7)-(8),  where  unobserved fixed  industry
heterogeneity  is controlled  for.25 Note that  these columns  provide estimates of the impact
of tariffs  on plant productivity  within industries over  time. We  also find a negative and sig-
nificant impact of tariffs on productivity in columns  (4)-(5) and (9)-(10), where we account
for  unobserved  persistent  characteristics  causing  serial  correlation  in plants'  error  terms.
Nominal  tariffs are measured in fractional terms, so their reduction by one percentage point
increases  productivity  by /1%.  For example,  the coefficient  in column  (7)  implies that  a
10% reduction  in 4-digit tariffs would lead to an increase in plant productivity  of almost 3%.
Overall,  the results support the hypothesis that lowering protection from foreign competition
generates  productivity  gains, even  after controlling  for unobservable  industry or plant-level
heterogeneity.
The coefficient  on tariffs in Eq.  (6) is unbiased,  unless some omitted factor influencing
productivity  is correlated  with tariffs.  A  difficulty that  may arise in our framework  is the
possibility  of endogenous  trade  policy with  respect  to plant  productivity,  especially  when
considering  current  (rather  than  lagged)  trade  policy.  A biased  estimate  of /1  would be
obtained  if (i)  the government  increased  trade protection in response to lobbying  by firms
in  industries  with  lower  productivity,  or  (ii)  it  adjusted  protection  to reflect  industries'
productivity  relative to other domestic or foreign industries.  Changes in tariff could be taken
241n  Eqs.  (6)-(9),  when trade protection  TP is measured by tariffs,  time subscripts  require a careful  inter-
pretation.  Suppose t-1, t,  7-  1, r are sample years in chronological  order.  pri, is affected  by tariffs TPt-1,
where t and t -1  are consecutive  sample years.  But for the next pair considered pr,i,  and TP4 1, r -1  may
be strictly larger than t if tariff data at t is unavailable  (though the same one year lag separates t - 1 from t
and r - 1 from r):  e.g.,  TFP  in 1981  is affected  by tariffs  in  1980, but the following pair considered is TFP
in 1984  affected  by tariffs in 1983,  since  tariff data is unavailable  in  1981-1982.
25Sample  sizes  differ  in  columns  (1)-(5)  and  (6)-(10)  since  tariff  data for  some  4-digit  industries  is not
disclosed.
13as  exogenous  if they resulted from  GATT  negotiations.  But  although Colombia  became  a
GATT member in 1981,  it did not participate in trade negotiations before the Uruguay Round
(1986-1994),  so tariff changes during our sample period are unrelated to GATT regulations.
We  argue that  during  our sample period,  trade policy determination  in Colombia  was
such that its endogeneity  with respect to productivity is not a serious concern.  The changes
in tariffs were cyclical and a policy response by the government to macroeconomic  shocks  for
short-run  stabilization  purposes.  Import  barriers  were  alternatively  loosened  or  tightened
to smooth out aggregate  expenditure  in response  to coffee  booms in the first liberalization
period or to external  payment deficits in the protection period  (Hallberg and Takacs,  1992).
While the first liberalization period was "stimulated by a desire to control money supply and
inflation without  an export-destroying  revaluation"  (Urrutia,  1994,  p.  297),  the protection
period  responded  to  escalating  fiscal  and  current  account  deficits.  Indeed,  tariff  revenue
represented  an important  fraction of government tax revenue  in Colombia - more than 16%
in  1981-1986  (World Bank,  1989).
Furthermore, across any pair of years, tariffs moved uniformly in an upward or downward
direction.  Although the magnitude of changes in tariffs differed significantly across industries,
they did not result from the government  asymmetrically changing  the tariffs protecting  less
productive industries in response to pressures.  Rather, the differential changes resulted from
the government's  interest  in  changing  more  strongly  the  tariffs  protecting  goods  "whose
demand  was  relatively  more  elastic  to  price  movements"  (Garay,  1991,  p.  19),  so  that
imports increased  or declined more rapidly.26
For  most  of  the  sample  period,  there  is  no  evidence  that  trade  policy  was  adjusted
by the  government  to  reflect  industries'  relative  productivities.  Trade  liberalization  was
not considered  as a channel  to  accelerate  growth  or to improve  the allocation  of resources
(Garcia,  1991).  In fact, trade liberalization was presented by DNP as a change needed for the
economy  to "start achieving greater  productivity growth and efficiency"  (Urrutia,  1994,  pp.
304-305)  only in  1990.  Moreover,  industrialists  only began to realize that (i)  the domestic
market  was not a dynamic  source of growth,  (ii)  trade  protection  had  high costs  and,  (iii)
exporters  became a strong pressure group only by the end of the 1980s.
26Our discussion does not imply the absence of political economy pressures during the sample period.  Colom-
bian producers expected government protection from foreign competition since the 1950s' import substitution
industrialization,  but the pressures were not specific to less productive  industries, but rather were widespread
across industries.  It is possible that these pressures operated  through nontariff barriers and not through tar-
iffs, since the approval  processes  in import licensing  regimes are more highly subject to discretion.
14While we believe that the endogeneity  of trade policy with respect  to productivity  is not
pronounced  for  Colombian  industries,  we  address  it  as  follows.  We estimate  the  effect  of
lagged rather  than contemporaneous  tariffs on plant  productivity.27 In addition,  we control
for unobserved  fixed industry characteristics that influence  simultaneously productivity  and
lagged  tariffs  with industry  fixed  effects.  In fact,  the positive sign  of the tariff coefficients
in  columns  (1)  and  (6)  is  reversed  once  those  fixed  effects  are  controlled  for.  Goldberg
and  Pavcnik  (2001)  argue  that  industry  fixed  effects  account  for  time-invariant  political
economy factors underlying  higher or lower trade protection across industries.  Finally, since
it is plausible that unobserved time-varying industry characteristics  influence simultaneously
productivity and tariffs, we instrument for tariffs with the same industry characteristics used
by Trefler  (1993)  in explaining  U.S.  nontariff barriers.28 These characteristics,  such as the
share of unskilled labor  in total employment,  reflect  industries'  propensity to get  organized
and political  economy  determinants  of protection.  The instrumented  coefficients  on lagged
3  and 4-digit  tariffs  remain negative  and significant  and increase  four  times in magnitude,
relative to OLS coefficients.29 Nevertheless,  these IV estimates should be viewed with caution
since they suffer from serious  caveats.30
As discussed earlier,  OLS production  function estimates are biased due to the correlation
between  inputs and  productivity.  Such  bias is  transmitted  to  the corresponding  residual
productivity  measures.  Our main concern  is  that this would be  reflected  in the estimated
impact of tariffs on productivity.  In fact,  although  the results are qualitatively unchanged,
27This also addresses  Tybout's  (1992)  concern that uncertainty  about the sustainability  of changes  in trade
policy delays the ensuing changes in productivity,  a relevant concern  for Colombia,  given the frequent  changes
in trade regime.  For GATT member countries,  another source of trade policy uncertainty is  the freedom of
authorities  to vary tariff levels above or below bound levels.  This is a minor concern for Colombia since only
36  items  were bound  upon GATT  membership  representing  a small percentage  of imports  (GATT,  1990).
However,  the dynamics  may be more complex than one-period  lagged tariffs  affecting  plant productivity.
28Ideally,  a dynamic model with simultaneous  determination  of protection  and productivity  should be used
to derive instruments  for time-varying  cross-sectional  patterns  of protection,  since  most political  economy
models such as Grossman and Helpman (1994)  predict only cross-sectional patterns of protection.  Developing
such a model,  however,  is beyond  the scope of this paper.
29WV  estimation covers the period  1981-1989  only,  given  some restrictions  in the availability  of data for the
instruments.  The corresponding OLS estimates  of Eq.  (6) are higher than those in Table 4.  The first-stage
regressions  for 3-digit  tariffs indicate  that these depend negatively  on Herfindahl  indexes and on capital and
positively  on total employment,  on a  proxy for minimum  efficient  scale,  on the share of unskilled  labor  in
total employment  and on output  growth.  The first-stage  regressions  for  4-digit  tariffs indicate that  these
depend  negatively  on capital and on output growth  and positively on total employment  and on the  share of
unskilled  labor  in total employment.  The results  for the  first-stage  are available  upon request  and  include
further instruments not mentioned  here due to their  lack of significance  in explaining tariffs.
3OSome  instruments  exhibit little variation over  time and hence  cannot  account  for the  variability  in trade
policy.  More crucially,  some instruments are correlated  with  productivity,  as it will be shown  in Section 7.
15the actual  impact  of tariffs  on OLS  productivity  is overestimated  relative  to the  unbiased
impacts in Table 4.
5.3.  Robustness  of the Impact of Tariffs
We now investigate  the robustness of our main  findings along several  dimensions.  First,
the productivity  gains associated with tariff declines could reflect the exit of less productive
plants with no change in the remaining plants' productivity levels.  Reduced  trade protection
and the consequent  decline in output prices may push previously profitable low productivity
producers  out  of business,  if exit  barriers  are  not  too  high.  We  use  four  approaches  to
examine whether  plant  exit affects our results.  The first  approach  consists of decomposing
changes  in industry  productivity  into:  (i)  changes  in continuing  plants'  productivity,  (ii)
reallocations  of output among continuing  plants with different  productivity  levels,  and  (iii)
a term representing  differences in productivity between cohorts of entrant and exiting plants
(see  the Appendix).  The major  sources  of change in  industry productivity  are  (i)  and  (ii)
while  (iii)  contributes  little  to  the  change,  particularly  the  lower  productivity  of exiting
plants.  The second  approach  involves  estimating  Eq.  (6)  only  for plants  that  remain  in
operation  until  1989. or  after.  The  negative  impact  of  tariffs  is  maintained.  The  third
approach  uses  probit  regressions  to  assess  how exit  probabilities  vary  with trade policy.
Exit  probabilities  increase  with tariffs,  controlling  for  plant  productivity  and year  effects.
However,  when  a control  for  time-invariant  differences  in exit  barriers  across  industries  is
added,  exit  probabilities  decrease  with tariffs.  As an  alternative  to tariffs,  we  use trade
regimes.  The results show that  exit probabilities decrease  in the protection and the second
liberalization  periods  relative  to  the first  liberalization  period,  with  or  without  industry
effects.  The  fourth  approach  considers  average  exit rates out  of industries with  relatively
stronger  tariff reductions  and shows that they are not systematically  higher than exit rates
out of industries with weaker tariff reductions.  In sum, there is evidence that less productive
plants exit, but higher exit is not linked to liberalization.  So, the gains associated with lower
tariffs in Table 4 reflect largely within-plant  changes in productivity.
Second,  RER variation  could  confound  the impact  of trade protection  on productivity.
Year effects  account  for macroeconomic  changes, but the RER may affect plants differently
depending  on  their industry's  trade  orientation  (Levinsohn,  1999).  In  Colombia,  during
the first  liberalization  period  the RER appreciates,  whereas  it depreciates  during  the sec-
16ond liberalization  period."  A RER depreciation  increases  the demand for and profitability
of traded  industries'  output.32 In  the short-run,  an  increase  in measured  productivity  oc-
curs when plants respond  by exploiting  unobserved unused capacity,  before adjusting input
choices.  If such a depreciation  accompanies  trade  liberalization,  then  the estimated  pro-
ductivity gains  (in traded industries)  could reflect  this capacity  adjustment.  Using a broad
concept  of productivity,  an increase in capacity  utilization is indistinguishable from an in-
crease in productivity,  so this RER  effect, if verified,  does not affect our results.  However,  we
estimate a specification where productivity depends on the RER  individually and interacted
with  an indicator  for  traded  industries,  that  indicator  individually,  a time trend  and the
trend interacted with the traded industries'  indicator. 3 The evidence  in Table  5,  columns
(1)-(5),  suggests  that  the RER  effect  is not verified:  RER  depreciations  are  significantly
associated with a productivity decline in traded industries.  To examine directly whether the
productivity  gains  due  to lower  tariffs  are robust  to variation  in the RER,  we  include the
RER  in Eq.  (6).  The results in columns  (6)-(9)  show a negative and significant  impact of
tariffs on productivity.  In the long run, a RER  depreciation  accompanying  trade liberaliza-
tion may protect producers  by increasing the' relative price of imports, partly counteracting
the pressure for productivity  improvement  and survival brought  by tariff reductions.  How-
ever,  estimating Eq.  (6)  for a period where both liberalization  and RER  depreciation occur
(1985-1989),  the negative  effect  of tariffs is maintained.  The same  is verified if the RER  is
included directly.  So, the effect of a depreciation  on producers'  incentives does not overcome
the effect  of tariff liberalization.  Overall,  the negative  impact  of tariffs  on productivity  is
robust to variation in the RER.
Third,  several  other robustness  checks  are performed.  Eq.  (6)  is reestimated  (i)  using
3'RER data is taken from the IMF International Financial  Statistics  (based  on relative  consumer prices).
32We classify  industries according to their degree of trade orientation as in Nishimizu  and Robinson  (1984).
During  1980-1991,  import-competing  industries  have an average import penetration  ratio above  10%,  while
export-oriented  industries  have an average  export orientation  ratio  above  10%, all  remaining industries  are
nontraded.  If an industry  has both  ratios above  10%,  it is classified  as traded.  All results  are robust to a
change in the cutoff point defining traded industries  from 10 to 8%.
33Also,  we attempt  to find evidence  of plants' changes  in capacity utilization  by considering correlations  of
plant productivity  growth  and output  growth as in  Pavcnik  (2002).  If in  response to a RER depreciation
output expands (contracts) in traded (nontraded)  industries without  a change in inputs, and correspondingly
measured productivity expands  (contracts), the correlation between changes in plant output and changes  in
plant  productivity  should  be strong and positive.  This correlation  is positive but  weak, ranging  from 0.044
in glass to 0.335 in furniture.  Also,  in traded industries in years of RER depreciation,  average inventories  of
finished goods  (in levels or as a fraction of output) do not systematically decline and the percentage  of plants
running  down output  and raw materials  inventories  (i.e.,  reporting  lower  inventories  in December  than  in
January  of that year)  does not systematically  increase.
17data for the protection and second liberalization periods only (which amounts to a framework
directly  comparable to that in before-after  studies),  (ii)  measuring  trade protection by two-
period  lagged  tariffs,  and  (iii)  adding  industry-level  output  as a  regressor  to  account  for
procyclicality  and  address  the possibility  that  the  negative  effect  of tariffs  is  not  a real
productivity effect but rather it results from the procyclical  nature of aggregate productivity
combined  with  lower  output  levels  under  high  trade  protection.  In  all  three  cases,  the
negative  and significant  effect  of tariffs on productivity  is  maintained.34 Finally,  to address
the  concern  that our findings could  result  from the very disaggregated  level  of analysis,  we
examine whether reduced trade protection generates productivity gains at the industry-level.
Tariffs have a negative effect on industry-level productivity.
5.4.  Skill Intensity, Imports of Intermediate Inputs and Investment
The  impact  of tariff protection  on plant productivity  reflects  to a large  extent within-
plant changes  in  productivity.  In this section,  we provide  evidence  on the possible  sources
of productivity gains at the plant  level related to trade liberalization.
Focusing  on the ratio of skilled employment  to total employment,  we find  that a large
majority of plants with productivity gains under liberalization experience an increase in their
skilled labor intensity  of production.35 This finding can be interpreted as an improvement  in
the underlying product-mix and/or an increase in plants' technological  sophistication  (Hunt
and Tybout,  1998)  due to increased  foreign  competition.
Increased  imports  of intermediate  inputs  can  be  a crucial  mechanism  for productivity
gains under trade  liberalization.  Imported  inputs  are utilized  by  about  25%  of the plants
in our sample.  Almost  half of the plants do not change their imports of inputs across years
or trade regimes,  most remain null.  However,  for plants that change  their imports,  most of
those having productivity  gains under trade  liberalization  increase their imports of inputs.
Industries  differ in the degree  to which  production. relies  on imported inputs,  therefore  in
the degree  to which this mechanism  may underlie  productivity gains.  We find that a much
larger  fraction  of  plants  with  productivity  gains  under  trade  liberalization  increase  their
imports  of inputs  in  the industries  whose  production  depends  more  heavily  on  imported
34We  also  reestimate  Eq.  (6)  using contemporaneous  tariffs  (despite the  endogeneity  problems).  Their
impact on productivity  is negative  and smaller than that of one-period lagged tariffs.
35This  finding  is robust  to focusing on  each year  separately,  on 3-digit  industries  with  the largest  relative
changes  in tariffs and to measuring skill intensity by the ratio of plant skilled to unskilled employment.inputs,  compared  to the fraction  of plants increasing  their imports  in other industries.36
Some  models  of investment  in  productivity  improvement  through  technology  acquisi-
tion show that protection favors that acquisition.  Nevertheless,  it is appealing to argue  the
contrary,  i.e., for productivity to increase under liberalization,  plants need to invest in tech-
nology, in particular imported.  We use plant-level machinery  investments and industry-level
machinery  imports to examine  this issue.37 Colombian  plants'  investment  is lumpy  and in
any year or trade regime, about 25%  of plants do not invest in machinery.  Under trade liber-
alization, however,  most plants with productivity  gains increase their machinery investments
in real terms or as a fraction of output.  Interestingly, under trade protection,  a large fraction
of plants with productivity  losses reduce their investments  in machinery.  These conclusions
are  tentative  given the  imperfections  of the data,  e.g.,  machinery  investments  do not  nec-
essarily  represent the acquisition of productivity-enhancing  technology.  Industry machinery
imports provide some insight on whether liberalization-related  technology diffusion is crucial
for  productivity  gains.  Imports  of machinery  for use  in manufacturing  (as a percentage  of
GDP) increase in 1980-1981, sharply decline with increased protection and recover after 1986
(declining  in  1991).  Similar paths are  verified  for machinery  used by the 3-digit  industries
textiles,  leather,  paper,  printing, food  and metals.
A  growing  micro-level  literature  on exporting  and productivity  tests the hypotheses  of
self-selection  of more  productive  plants  into exports  markets versus  learning-by-exporting
(Bernard and Jensen,  1999a,  1999b for the U.S.; Clerides, Lach and Tybout,  1998 for Colom-
bia, Mexico  and Morocco).  We examine  whether  a plant's export status influences  its pro-
ductivity gains due to trade liberalization.  As in previous studies, our findings  suggest that
exporting in year t is not associated with productivity gains from year t to year t +  1.
36Nominal  imports  of inputs  are normalized  by a deflator  that weights the costs of domestic  and imported
inputs.  If imported  input  prices  increase,  e.g.,  by less than  domestic  input  prices,  the  deflated  values  are
measured  with error,  being lower  than true imported  inputs.  We believe that this measurement problem is
not serious since the results are qualitatively  similar for deflated values of imported inputs and for imported
inputs  as  a  fraction  of  total  intermediate  inputs.  We  consider  two  measures  for  the dependence  of  an
industry's production  on  imported  inputs:  the average  ratio of industry-level  imported inputs to industry-
level output calculated across years and the average ratio of plant-level imported inputs to plant-level output
calculated within  industries  across years.
37Note  that  plant-level  machinery  investments  are not  disaggregated  into  domestic  and foreign  (as  is  the
case in the  theoretical  models).  Industry-level  machinery  imports  are taken  from  World  Trade  Analyzer
1980-1991  (Statistics  Canada CD-Rom),  commodity  class  7  (Machinery  and transport  equipment)  in the
SITC  revision  2 classification.  Aggregating  the  subclasses  in  class  7, one  obtains  machinery  imports  for
use  in manufacturing  industries.  For some subclasses, it is possible to identify  unambiguously  which 3-digit
ISIC industry  uses the imports:  e.g.,  subclass  726 printing and bookbinding  machinery  and parts is used by
industry 342 printing.  But these data do not indicate which plants use the imported machinery.
195.5.  Average  Impact of ERP and Import Penetration
To check the robustness of the findings with tariffs,  we use alternative measures of trade
protection.  ERP  provide  information  on the protective  structure  resulting  from  tariffs on
output  and on imported  inputs.38 The results  from estimating Eq.  (6)  with lagged  3-digit
ERP are presented in Table 6, columns (1)-(4).  The impact of ERP on plant productivity is
positive,  not  significant  with industry effects  and  significant  with plant fixed  effects.39 The
contrast relative to the negative impact of tariffs could stem from a difference  in the samples
used.  However,  using  the ERP sample,  a negative impact  of tariffs  on productivity  is  still
obtained.  There appears to be a real difference between the impact of nominal protection and
that of effective  protection to final output on productivity that is curious  given the positive
correlation  between  tariffs  and ERP  during  the  period.  Ultimately,  ERP  coefficients  are
not robust and become negative eliminating the most influential observations  or the outliers,
whereas the coefficients on tariffs are always negative.  Also, ERP coefficients are expected to
be insignificant since data requirements (e.g., coefficients  from input-output tables) introduce
serious noise in ERP calculations,  which is confirmed in  OLS specifications.
Import  penetration  ratios are an outcome of trade policy and  measure  the exposure  to
foreign  competition.  We expect  these ratios to affect productivity  positively if plants lower
costs and become more efficient  when import competition  increases.  However,  if imports are
endogenous with respect to domestic industries' productivity  (e.g., in a Ricardian framework,
imports are attracted to relatively less productive  industries), a negative correlation  between
import penetration  and productivity  could  be found.  Eq.  (6)  is  estimated  using lagged  3
and 4-digit import penetration  ratios and the results are presented in Table  6, columns (5)-
(12).  In general,  import penetration  has  a large,  positive  and significant  impact  on plant
productivity.  For example,  column  (7) indicates that  a 10% increase in import penetration
into  3-digit  industries increases  plant productivity  by 6%.  These findings are not driven by
the period used in the import penetration specifications.  In fact,  using an alternative period,
38However, the use of ERP could be conceptually problematic.  Our production function estimation allows for
changes in the mix of primary factors and intermediate inputs, but ERP represent protection to value-added
which  assumes that  intermediate  inputs are used  in fixed proportion to output.
39The ERP  on  a final good  declines  if either tariffs  on the  final  good  decline  or  if tariffs  on  intermediate
inputs increase,  in  relative  terms.  So,  an interpretation  of the  significant  positive  impact  in  fixed  effects
specifications  could  be  that lowering  ERP  leads to  productivity  losses  if that  occurs  via  increased  tariffs
on  intermediate  inputs.  With  no information  on  the tariffs  on inputs  imported and used in each  industry,
we  cannot  tell whether  this interpretation  is  correct.  But a requirement  for  its validity  is  verified:  in  a
fixed  effects specification  relating productivity to tariffs and ERP,  a negative tariff coefficient  (-1.013) and a
positive ERP coefficient  (0.465) are obtained  and both are significant.
20for which  data  on tariffs -and import  penetration  is  available  (1981,  1984-1989),  the same
robust  conclusion  is drawn:  lagged import  penetration  affects positively plant  productivity
and lagged tariffs affect it negatively.
6.  Productivity,  Trade Policy  and Plant Size
6.1.  Tariffs, Plant Size  and Exports
Of particular  interest  is the  question  of whether  tariffs affect  productivity  differentially
according  to plant  size.40 We estimate  the following specification:
prit =3`  0S +I3OL  + At  X  I  +  At  x I  +  f  ls(TPt-1 x  IS) +I31L(TPtj  I x IL) + I i  +  U j,  (7)
where  /%s,  80L,  Is,  IL  are intercepts  and  indicator  variables  for  small  and  large  plants,
respectively,  and TPtj1,  At,  Ii  are defined  as in Eq.  (6).  Size is defined  as employment  at  a
plant in its first year in the sample to mitigate the endogeneity  problem that would result if
Is  and IL were indexed  by time, given the potential  impact of trade liberalization  on plant
size.41 Panel  A of Table  7 presents  the results  from  estimating  Eq.  (7) with  small  plants
having  less  than  50  employees.  F-tests  indicate  that  large  plants  are  significantly  more
productive  than  small  plants.  F-tests  also  show  that  the  effect  of tariffs  on  productivity
differs significantly across  plant size.  This  effect is much  more negative  for large plants.  For
example,  the  coefficients  in column  (5)  imply that reducing  tariffs  by  10%  would  result  in
a productivity  gain of 4%  for large plants,  twice  as much  as the gain  for small plants.  The
results are robust to restricting  year effects to be equal across all plants and to changing the
cutoff defining small plants to 20 or  100 employees.
An alternative definition of plant size is the plant's market share in total industry output
in its first year in the sample,  msh 1. The following  specification  is estimated,  allowing  for
4OSome  theoretical  and empirical  evidence  is  available  regarding the  differential  effect  of trade  policy on
output and  price-cost  margins  across  plant size.  Roberts  and Tybout  (1996)  find that,  within  Colombian
industries  facing increased import penetration,  larger plants experience  stronger declines in price-cost mar-
gins.  In  contrast,  Dutz  (1996)  shows  how  incumbents  adjust  output  to  liberalized  import quotas  in  an
oligopoly  model, concluding  that smaller  plants, with  lower market  shares and higher  marginal costs,  expe-
rience  relatively stronger  output contractions  in  response to increased  imports.  Also,  developing countries'
manufacturing  industries  are often dualistic, accommodating  a few oligopolistic producers and a large num-
ber of small firms that operate  under stronger competition,  are more sensitive to the economic environment
and more flexible  to change.
4llncreased  exposure to foreign  competition  may  increase  plant  size by  increasing the elasticity  of demand
(reinforced  by  entry  and  exit).  But,  it  may  reduce  demand,  causing  industry  contraction  and  decreasing
plant size.  Most empirical  studies find that trade liberalization  is associated  with reduced plant  size (Dutz,
1996;  Roberts and Tybout,  1991;  Tybout and Westbrook,  1995).
21a non-linear  relationship between  plant size and productivity:
Pri=  +  At +  limsh  shXi) 2 +  33TPtS1 +  I  4(TPt11 x mshii)  + Ii  + u,j.  (8)
Panel  B of Table  7 presents  the  results for  plant market  shares relative  to 3-digit  industry
output.  Plant productivity  increases  with market  share at a diminishing  rate.  Controlling
for  industry  effects,  tariffs  affect  negatively  and  significantly  productivity,  as  in  Table  4.
Tariff  liberalization  has  a more  positive  impact  on the productivity  of plants with  higher
market  shares.  In column  (2),  for example,  the marginal effect of tariffs  on productivity  for
a plant  with the average  market  share  is -0.11.42  The  results are qualitatively  similar for
market shares relative to 4-digit industry output.
The finding that productivity  gains  are higher  for large plants suggests that trade liber-
alization  brings a decline  in 'inefficiency  rents' benefiting  large producers and/or that large
producers'  output  competes  more  directly  with imports.  Also,  large  plants  use  imported
inputs  in  production  more  often  than small  plants.  Therefore,  the stronger  effect  of lib-
eralization  on  large  plants'  productivity  could  be  operating  through  the  imported  inputs
mechanism.  In  fact,  we  find  a  much  higher  proportion  of large  plants  with productivity
gains under liberalization  that increase their imports  of inputs than the proportion  of small
plants doing so.
We  also  examine  whether  the  impact  of  trade  policy  on  productivity  is  stronger  for
plants engaging in export activities.  Our specification parallels that of Eq.  (7) and includes
lagged  tariffs, year and industry effects,  an indicator variable  for exporters  defined  as plants
exporting in their first  year in the sample and the interaction  of this variable with  tariffs.43
The estimates indicate that the productivity of exporters is more positively affected by trade
liberalization  than  that of non-exporters.  A  similar  result is obtained  when  exporters  are
defined as plants exporting in every sample year.  These results are consistent with the finding
of a stronger positive effect of trade liberalization on large plants, since Colombian exporters
are  significantly  larger  than  non-exporters.  Size  and  export  status  are  highly  correlated
across  plants,  so it is difficult  to sort out  their individual  influence  on the impact of trade
policy on plant  productivity.
42The marginal effect of tariffs in Eq.  (8) is obtained as ,3 + 34msh (msh is the average  market share in the
sample).  The averages of the regressors  used to calculate  the corresponding  marginal effects  are reported in
Tables  7-10.  The  marginal  effects of the  regressors in Eqs.  (7)-(9)  are  shown in Fernandes  (2002).
43Allowing  a  plant's  export  status  to be time-varying  would  result  in an  endogeneity  problem  since  trade
policy  affects  a plant's decision to export.
226.2.  ERP, Import Penetration  and Plant Size
Table 8  assesses  the robustness  of the finding that the effect  of tariffs  on productivity
depends  on plant size.  Panel A shows the results from estimating Eq.  (7) with lagged  ERP
(columns (1)-(2))  and lagged import penetration ratios (columns  (3)-(6)).  Panel B presents
the results from estimating Eq.  (8)  with lagged ERP  (columns (1)-(2))  and lagged  import
penetration  ratios  (columns  (3)-(6)).  Both  panels  are  consistent  with  our  findings  when
using tariffs as a measure  of trade protection."4
7.  Productivity,  Trade Policy and Domestic Competition
7.  1.  Tariffs and Domestic Competition
In this section, we examine whether trade liberalization  affects more strongly the produc-
tivity of plants  in industries  with  less domestic  competition.45 We use  two measures  from
the industrial organization literature that capture different dimensions of domestic competi-
tion.  Herfindahl  indexes summarize  the degree of market share inequality across plants in an
industry.  Turnover rates  reflect,  at least imperfectly,  the market  power  of large plants  and
their ability  to inhibit entry into an industry,  as well  as sunk costs preventing  exit.  Given
the  potential  impact of trade liberalization  on  concentration,  entry  and exit,  the degree  of
domestic competition  is measured by the value of Herfindahl  indexes and turnover  rates in
the first sample year and taken as a fixed industry characteristic.  We estimate the following
specification:
,k=  ++X  + Ik  +Ui,k
pr7i'  =0+A  +  A  l3TPtjj 13+ 2DC  +  3(TPtl  DC')  k +3,k  (9)
where DC' represents  the degree  of domestic  competition in industry j  and TPt-ji,  At,  I i
are  defined  as in Eq.  (6).  Since  DCO  is a fixed characteristic  of industries  indexed  by j,
only industry effects at a higher level of aggregation,  k, are identified  in Eq.  (9).  The results
from estimation with lagged tariffs and Herfindahl indexes are presented in Table 9, columns
(1)-(6).  Overall, we find that plants in less competitive domestic industries according  to 3 or
4-digit  Herfindahl  indexes have  lower productivity.  Columns  (1)-(6)  show that the  effect of
tariff liberalization  on plant productivity depends on whether 3 or 4-digit Herfindahl indexes
44The findings in Panels A and B are qualitatively  unchanged when restricting year effects to be equal across
all plants,  changing the  cutoff defining  small  plants from  50 to  20 or  100 employees  or  using plant  market
shares relative to 4-digit industry output,  respectively.
45Roberts and Tybout  (1996) find that increased import penetration leads to larger reductions in the price-
cost margins of the more concentrated  Colombian  industries.
23are used.  However,  a more careful  analysis with marginal  effects  of tariffs at average 3  and
4-digit  Herfindahl  indexes  indicates  that  tariff liberalization  affects  more  positively  plant
productivity  in  less competitive domestic  industries.
The results from estimating  Eq.  (9)  with 3-digit  turnover  rates are presented  in Table
9,  columns  (7)-(8).  The marginal  effects  of turnover  rates  at average  tariffs indicate  that
plants in less  competitive  domestic industries have lower productivity.  Both the coefficients
on tariffs and the marginal  effects of tariffs at average turnover rates indicate that tariff lib-
eralization affects more positively plant productivity in less competitive domestic industries.
7.2.  ERP, Import Penetration  and Domestic Competition
Table  10  examines  the robustness of the findings in section  7.1.  Columns  (1)-(4)  show
the  results  from  estimating  Eq.  (9)  with  lagged  ER.P,  Herfindahl  indexes  and  turnover
rates  and columns  (5)-(12)  show  the results  from  estimating  Eq.  (9)  with lagged  import
penetration ratios, Herfindahl  indexes and turnover rates.  These results are consistent with
those obtained when using tariffs as a measure of trade protection except  when ERP and  3-
digit Herfindahl  indexes are used as measures of trade protection  and domestic competition,
respectively.  In  this  case,  the  marginal  effects  suggest  that ERP  affect  positively  plant
productivity  in less competitive  industries.
8.  Conclusion
This paper  provides new  evidence on the link between trade policy and plant-level  pro-
ductivity  using  Colombian  data.  The  consistent  production  function  estimates  reveal,  by
comparison  to OLS,  the endogeneity  of plants'  input choices  with respect  to productivity.
Relying  on productivity  estimates that  correct  for such endogeneity  is crucial  to estimate
accurately  the  effect  of trade  policy  on productivity.  Our analysis  relies  on cross-industry
and  time variation  in  measures  of trade  policy  and  thereby  circumvents  the shortfalls  of
previous studies that focus on a single episode  of liberalization.
Our findings suggest that trade liberalization has a strong positive  impact on plant pro-
ductivity,  even  after  controlling  for  unobserved  plant  and  industry  heterogeneity  and for
the real  exchange rate.  The use of lagged  tariffs,  the control  for unobserved  industry  fixed
characteristics,  and the evidence  that  changes in  Colombian  tariffs were generally  a policy
response  to fiscal  and external  imbalances  suggest  that the negative  impact of tariffs  does
24not reflect the endogeneity of protection.  Plant exit is not a major source for increased pro-
ductivity under trade liberalization.  Within-plant  productivity  gains are the crucial  source
and appear to be associated  with increased skilled labor  intensity of production,  imports of
intermediate inputs and machinery investments.  We find that the impact of trade liberaliza-
tion on productivity is stronger for large plants and for plants in industries with less domestic
competition.  Further research on the plant-level characteristics  associated with productivity
gains due to trade liberalization  would be fruitful.
From a policy perspective,  our research  suggests that  the liberalization  of policies  pro-
tecting manufacturing  industries  from  foreign  competition  brings benefits  in terms of pro-
ductivity.  Of course, the generalization of our results to other countries'  micro-level  datasets
is  not immediate.  The effect  of trade  liberalization  on plant  productivity  depends  on the
details of the liberalization  and on its interaction  with institutions and other policies.
25Appendix
Two decompositions  of changes  in  industry productivity  are considered  in Section  5.3.
The first is given by:
Pt  -PtJit=(  E  1 1r)  pr_ 1 :)  E  priL.  (s  - s  1) +  E  spri  s  pri 
iECont  iECont  iEEnt  iEEx
where Pt' is industry productivity  (weighted average  of plants'  productivities),  prit  and  sit
are plant i's productivity  and market share in industry j  output for continuing plants Cont,
entrant  plants Ent and exiting plants  Ex.  The first term in the decomposition  represents
the change  in continuing plants' productivity.  The second term represents the output share
reallocation  among  continuing  plants with different  productivity  levels.  Finally,  the third
and fourth terms represent  average productivity  of entrant  and  exiting plants, respectively.
The second  follows  Aw, Chen and Roberts  (2001)  and is given by:
t-PA  =  E  (si+t-  st  (m'd  -Prit- 1) +  E  2(pri 1L +Priti)(s.  -s  ¾)
iECont  iECont
+2  (sExt_1  I+  Sint t)(PrE'xt-1 -PrEnt t)  +  2 (PrE-'xt-1 + PrE-nt t)(SEx t-1  SEnt t 22
where pri  and st  are defined as above,  sE  tl  and S  t are the market share of entrant and
exiting  plants  in industry j, and  wE  t-land  wEnt t  are  the output  share-weighted  average
productivity  of entrant and exiting plants in industry j. The first term represents  the change
in continuing plants' productivity.  The second term represents the output share reallocation
among continuing  plants  with different  productivity  levels.  The third  term represents  the
difference  between the productivity of entrant  plants in year t and of exiting plants in year
t - 1. Finally,  the fourth term represents  the output share  reallocation  between  entrant and
exiting plants.
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30Table  1
Nominal Tariffs across 3-digit Industriesa
Industry  Average  Average  Average
Tariff (%)  Tariff (%)  Tariff (%)
First Liberalization  Protection  Second Liberalization
Period  Period  Period
311  Food  30.5  40.6  43.4
312 Food-miscellaneous  28.4  35.8  37.7
313 Beverages  54.5  73.9  58.1
314 Tobacco  26.4  34.5  42.0
321  Textiles  57.3  82.6  48.4
322 Apparel  75.6  109;6  66.4
323 Leather products  40.8  53.1  39.8
324 Footwear  56.4  84.0  71.8
331  Wood products  41.4  55.7  43.7
332 Furniture  54.2  75.9  47.5
341 Paper  28.7  38.9  35.3
342 Printing  38.6  45.9  42.6
351 Industrial chemicals  20.2  26.7  24.0
352 Other chemicals  19.8  24.4  22.3
354 Petroleum derivatives  18.8  24.5  23.3
355 Rubber products  47.8  55.6  43.9
356 Plastics  61.9  73.1  55.2
361  Ceramics  47.4  61.6  47.8
362 Glass  35.8  38.9  32.1
369 Nonmetallic minerals  29.4  36.2  30.8
371  Iron and steel  20.2  25.8  20.9
372 Nonferrous metals  20.1  26.6  18.9
381 Metal products  40.1  49.6  39.0
382 Nonelectrical  machinery  23.6  30.1  20.9
383 Electrical machinery  34.4  43.5  31.7
384 Transport equipment  26.7  37.2  31.3
385 Professional  equipment  25.1  30.4  24.4
390 Other manufacturing  37.1  49.2  37.3
a  The  periods  used  to  compute  the  average  tariffs  are  as  follows:  (i)  1976-1980  for  the  first
liberalization  period,  (ii)  1983-1984  for the protection period, and  (iii)  1985-1988  for the second
liberalization  period.  Note that for industries  311  and 312 average tariffs  in the protection period
are higher than in the first liberalization  period but lower than in the second liberalization  period.
The largest increase in tariffs for those industries only occurred in 1984 when the tariff levels were
45.1 for industry 311  and 39.8 for industry 312.
31Table 2
Import Penetration Ratios and Export Orientation  Ratios across 3-digit Industriesa
Industry  Export Orientation Ratio (%)  Import Penetration Ratio (%)
Year  Year
1980  1984  1985  1988  1991  1980  1984  1985  1988  1991
311  Food  9.1  3.6  3.8  5.8  11.4  6.4  5.3  4.0  4.5  3.4
312 Food-miscellaneous  2.4  5.1  6.6  7.0  7.1  2.3  3.2  3.2  2.8  2.0
313 Beverages  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.6  1.5  1.4  1.4  1.9  1.0
314 Tobacco  0.6  0.9  0.7  3.1  13.4  9.5  4.4  3.1  1.8  4.1
321  Textiles  7.7  5.3  5.7  7.6  16.8  3.1  1.9  2.1  2.8  4.8
322 Apparel  17.6  7.3  9.8  27.7  47.3  1.9  3.1  2.7  3.3  4.5
323 Leather products  13.2  14.6  23.9  34.9  45.0  1.7  1.2  1.3  2.0  3.5
324 Footwear  10.4  5.0  8.4  11.4  31.6  0.8  1.0  1.1  0.7  0.6
331  Wood products  10.5  5.1  12.6  6.5  15.8  7.3  6.6  3.2  5.2  5.4
332 Furniture  4.6  2.4  6.2  4.1  8.1  1.5  0.9  0.3  0.9  1.0
341  Paper  5.1  4.5  3.3  1.8  2.9  16.6  15.7  17.2  17.0  16.9
342 Printing  10.1  7.0  11.9  16.9  26.5  11.5  7.9  11.2  6.2  5.3
351  Industrial  chemicals  7.0  6.4  8.1  12.1  18.1  40.5  38.6  65.6  44.3  43.9
352 Otherchemicals  2.9  2.9  3.1  2.3  3.2  14.4  14.5  16.9  12.6  11.8
354 Petroleum derivatives  n a.  n.a.  n.a.  na.  n.a.  5.8  4.2  3.3  3.5  4.7
355 Rubber products  2.0  1.3  1.5  4.2  6.1  11.3  8.5  8.0  8.6  10.1
356 Plastics  2.8  2.1  2.1  .1.3  2.5  2.0  2.2  1.9  2.1  3.6
361  Ceramics  9.9  2.8  5.1  7.0  28.3  7.2  3.8  2.0  2.9  6.1
362 Glass  9.7  5.2  4.3  4.2  10.6  9.5  6.1  5.7  4.7  8.2
369 Nonmetallic  minerals  8.6  4.0  5.1  5.6  9.1  3.5  2.5  2.9.  3.5  2.9
371  Iron and steel  na.  na.  na.  na.  nra.  38.5  35.8  82.0  34.0  39.7
372 Nonferrous metals  2.6  10.3  13.9  7.4  4.8  51.2  51.8  92.2  .45.4  50.2
381  Metal products  7.1  .3.4  3.8  4.6  10.1  15.1  14.4  14.6  12.3  15.9
382 Nonelectrical machinery  12.1  4.1  6.6  5.7  17.6  71.8  70.5  178.8  68.3  70.2
383 Electrical machinery  3.1  1.4  3.3  4.6  9.6  38.6  37.8  42.4  36.4  43.5
384Transportequipment  3.0  0.9  1.2  0.7  5.6  40.7  31.8  46.6  28.3  29.7 385 Professional equipment  14.6  7.6  8.6  6.8  14.4  57.4  53.6  116.8  46.3  54.1
390 Other manufacturing  37.0  18.4  17.5  42.9  58.1  11.7  9.6  5.7  7.2  12.4
a  The  export  orientation  ratio  is defined  as  the  ratio  of exports  to total  output  (domestic  output plus  exports).  The  import penetration  ratio  is
defined  as  the  ratio  of imports  to  domestic demand  (domestic  output plus  imports).  n.a  indicates  that  export data for petroleum derivatives  and
iron and steel has irregularities.Table 3
Production  Function Estimates with Materials Controlling  for Simultaneity Bias'
Industry  Input  OLS  Revenue  Nonparam/  R.  Industry  Input  OLS  Revenue  Nonparam/  R
shares  GMM  scale  shares  GMM  scale
321+322Textiles  Labor  0.316***  0.275  0.242'**  369 Nonmetallic  Labor  04050**  0.330  0.381**
and Apparel  (0.004)  (0.014)  minerals  (0.01)  (0.02)
Energy  0.1460*  0.018  0.115***  1  .028'  Energy  0.212*0*  0.090  0.186***  0.992'
(0.003)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.012)
Nobs  Materials  0.471 **  0.500  0.66*0*  Nobs  Materials  0.406***  0.344  0.31 ***
20379  (0.003)  (0.053)  4502  (0.004)  (0.084)
Capital  0.049***  0.207  0.011  Capital  0.047***  0.237  0.116***
(0  .003)  (0.03)  (0  .005)  (0.038)
311+312  Food  Labor  . 022w  0.149  0.1540**  3520ther  Labor  0.287***  0.194  0.269*-*
products  (0.005)  (0.008)  Chemnicals  (0.007)  (0.014)
Energy  0.160**  0.034  0.095***  1.058'  Energy  0.018***  0.012  0.008  0.996'
(0.004)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.009)
N. obs.  Materials  0.588***  0.647  0.731 ***  Nobs  Materials  0.707***  0.521  0.658*-
17651  (0.002)  (0.043)  4296  (0.005)  (0.045)
Capital  0.088***  0.170  0.077*  Capital  0.071***  0.273  0.061**
(0.003)  (0.042)  (0.004)  (0.027)
381  Metal  Labor  0.329**0  0.266  0.288***  356 Plastics  Labor  - 0.3250**  0.196  0.303**
products  (0.006)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.015)
Energy  0.095*  .0.024  0.053***  0.962'  Energy  0.01 40**  0.032  -0.015*  1.032'
(0.004)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.008)
Nobs  Materials  0.587*0*  0.509  0.523**  NMobs  Materials  0.596***  0.548  0.642***
8581  (0.004)  (0.046)  4059  (0.005)  (0.034)
Capital  0.048***  0.201  0.098***  Capital  0.112***  0.224  0.103***
(0.003)  (0.031)  (0.005)  (0.03)
331 +332 Wood  Labor  0.234***  0.302  0.21 *"  324 Footwear  Labor  0.259*0*  0.255  0.228*0*
products and  (0.007)  (0.015)  (0.008)  (0.021)
furniture  Energy  0.115***  0.021  0.096***  0.886'  Energy  0.109**-  0.010  0.0670*  1.018'
(0.005)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.029)
Nobs  Materials,  0.6350*0  0.496  0.480**  Nobs  Materials  0.6080**  0.531  0.674***
5652  (0.005)  (0.069)  3594  (0.006)  (0.049)
Capital  0.033***  0.181  0.1***  Capital  0.027*0*  0.204  0.049
(0.003)  (0.026)  (0.005)  (0.032)
342 Printing  Labor  0.586*"*  0.295  0.516"*  384 Transport  Labor  0.372**-  0.274  0.353**
(0.011)  (0.025)  equipment  (0.012)  (0.025)
Energy  -0.026*0*  0.017  -0.055*"  1.096  Energy  0.025**'  0.024  0.009  0.922'
(0.007)  (0.013)  (0.007)  (0.012)
Nobs  Materials  0.484*"*  0.443  0.523***  Nobs  Materials  0.574"'0  0.491  0.47*"*
5224  (0.007)  (0.04)  3310  (0.006)  (0.083)
Capital  0.077*"*  0.244  0.112*0*  Capital  0.097*0*  0.211  0.09
(0.005)  (0.03)  (0,007)  (0.058)
382 Nonelectrical  Labor  0.302"'*  0.280  0.284*0*  383 Electrical  Labor  0.291 "*-  0.264  0.2860**
machinery  (0.01)  (0.016)  mnachinery  (0.01)  (0.022)
Energy  0.056'**  0.023  0.046***  0.842'  ,  Energy  0.04"  0.018  0.031***  0.907'
(0.006)  (0.009)  - (0.006)  (0.012)
Nobs  Materials  0.612"*'  0.468  0.381*"  Nobs  Materials  0.669*"*  0.518  0.526**
4585  (0.005)  (0.162)  2824  (0.007)  (0.121)
Capital  0.0840**  0.229  0.131  Capial  .0068**.  0.200  - 0.064..
(0.005)  (0.084)  (0.006)  (0.055)Table  3 (continued)
Industry  Input  OLS  Revenue  Nonparan./  R.  Industry  Input  OLS  Revenue  Nonparam./  R.
shares  GMM  scale  shares  GMM  srale
341  Paper  Labor  O.2***  0.181  0.204***  371  Isnnandsteel  Labor  0.238***  0.227  0.201***
(0.01)  (0.03)  (0.019)  (0.029)
Energy  0.065***  0.032  0.043***  0.917'  Energy  O.O7***  0.049  0.O51***  1.041'
(0.005)  (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.013)
Robs  Materials  0.723***  0.581  0.57*s*  R~obs  Materials  0.674***  0.528  0.78***
2017  (0.005)  (0.09)  823  (0.009)  (0.183)
Capital  0.067***  0.205  0.1**  Capital  0.0780**  0.196  0.009
(0.005)  (0.044)  (0.01)  (0.131)
31 3  Beverages  Labor  0.265*0*  0.197  0.233***  362 Glass  Labor  0.35***  0.272  0.342***
(0.016)  (0.03)  (0.015)  (0.031)
Energy  0.1 93***  0.027  0.119***  0.909'  Energy  0.119***  0.075  0.102***  1.  124'
(0.009)  (0.021)  (0.008)  (0.016)
N  nbs.  Materials  0.55S**$  0.438  0.543*0*  NRobs  Matenals  0.581*5*  0.435  0.67***
1975  (0.01)  (0.079)  815  (0.011)  (0.071)
Capital  0.05***  0.338  0.014  Capital  0.025***  0.218  0.01
(0.009)  (0.056)  (0.01)  (0.056)
351  Industrial  Labor  0.095***  0.148  0.1 16**  361  Ceranmics  Labor  0.**  0.455  0.506***
chenmicals  (0.017)  (0.03)  (0.026)  (0.067)
Energy  0.084***  0.062  0.080**  0.913'  Energy  0.1 2***  0.092  0.081 **  1.05'
(0.009)  (0.022)  (  0.014)  (0.022)
Nobs  Materials  0.555***  0.497  0.278**  NMobs  Materials  0.45***  0.259  0.386***
1713  (0.008)  (0.121)  503  (0.01 8)  (0.133)
Capital  0.238***  0.294  0.439***  Capital  0.026**  0.194  0.077
(0.011)  (0.132)  --(0.012)  (0.094)
323 Leather  Labor  0.198***  0.233  0.243*'  372 Nonferrous  Labor  0.355***  0.230  0.315**
products  (0.01)  (0.01 9)  metals  (0.035)  (0.047)
Energy  O.O3S**$  0.014  0.009  0.845'  Energy  0.1 7***  0.039  .0.08**  0.978'
(0.007)  (0.013)  (0.023)  (0.035)
R.obs  Materials  0.684***  0.571  0.53*w  Robs  Materials  0.416  *  0.489  0.549 **
1462  (0.009)  (0.1 )  435  (0.  01 9)  (0.17)
Capital  O.O35**  0.182  0.063  Capital  0.1 38***  0.242  0.034
(0.006)  (0.048)  (0.018)  (0.176)
355  Rubber  Labor  0.294***  0.234  0.261 ***  354 Petmieum  Labor  0.213***  0.104  0.283***
products  (0.01 3)  (0.025)  derivatives  (0.041)  (0.079)
Energy  0.046*0*  0.035  0.051 **  0.862  Energy  0.052***  0.042  0.027  1.001'
(0.009)  (0.014)  .(0.017)  (0.029)
Nobs  Materials  0.673***  0.511  0.53**  NRobs  Materials  0.821 *'*'  0.634  0.520*
1196  (0.01 )  (0.054)  306  (0.01 9)  (0.159)
Capital  0.05l  **  0.220  0.02  Capital  0.007  0.220  0.1 71  **
(0.009)  (0.057)  (0.022)  (0.087)
385  Professional  Labor  0.39***  0.321  0.396***  314 Tobacco  Labor  0.266***  0.202  0.322***
equipment  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.053)  (0.08)
Energy  0.042***  0.019  0.017  0.898'  Energy  0.1 87*  0.009  0.018  0. 91 7'
(0.013)  (0.016)  (0.035)  (0.039)
N.  obs.  Materials  0.539**  0.423  0.41 8**  Mobs  Materials  0.535***  0.516  0.389***
935  (0.012)  (0.135)  269  (0.034)  (0.224)
Capital  0.091 ***  0.238  0.075  Capital  0.077***  0.274  0.188
(0.01 )  (0.09)  (0.029)  (0.193)
Bootstmpped  standaftd  errors  in parentheses.  ~,~and  indicate  significance  at 1%I/,  5%  and  10%  levels,  respectively.  'indicates  that the  hypothesis of constant  retumns  to  scale cannot  be
rejected.  Average revenue  shares are  conLsidered  and the  average capital  revenue  share is  obtained as one  minus the  average  revenue  shares of labor,energy  andmrw  materials.Table 4
Impact of Lagged Tariffs on Plant Productivitya
Regressors  OLS  OLS  OLS  Plant  Plant
Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Nominal tariff 3-digit  0.177***  -0.095***  -0.092***  -0.051***  .- 0.07***
(0.018)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.015)  (0.016)
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Industry effects 3-digit  Yes
Industry effects 4-digit  Yes  Yes
N. observations  57861  57861  57861  57861  57861
R-squared  0.01  0.11  0.15  0.03  0.06
Regressors  OLS  OLS  OLS  Plant  Plant
Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects
(6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
Nominal tariff 4-digit  0.08***  -0.268***  -0.096 ***  -0.077***  -0.076***
(0.017)  (0.027)  (0.023)  (0.015)  (0.016)
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Industry effects 3-digit  Yes
Industry effects  4-digit  Yes  Yes
N. observations  54501  54501  54501  54501  54501
R-squared  0.01  0.12  0.15  0.04  0.05
a  The dependent variable is plant productivity.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  ***,  ** and
* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  All regressions include a constant, plant
age and age squared.  The coefficients  on age are significant  at the 1% level and range from 0.002 to
0.006.  The  coefficients  on age squared range  from -0.00001  to  -0.0008.  Sample  years  included are
1977,  1979,  1981,  1984-1989.  One-period lagged tariff measures  are used.
35Table 5
Impact of Real Exchange  Rates and Lagged Tariffs on Plant Productivitya
Regressor  OLS  Plant  OLS  OLS  Plant  OLS  Plant  OLS  - Plant
Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) Traded 3-digit Industries  -0.234***  -0.149***
(0.039)  (0.025)
Traded 4-digit Industries  -0.225***  -0.179***  -0.184***
(0.04)  (0.042)  (0.025)
RER  . -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.0002  -0.0004***  0.00006  -0.0003***
(0.0002)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0001)
RERxTradedInd.  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***
(0.0002)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0001)
Trend  -0.019***  -0.024***  -0.019***  -0.018***  -0.025***  0.001  -0.009***  0.003  -0.01***
(0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002) Trend x Traded Ind.  0.015***  0.014***  0.013***  0.01***  0.013***
(0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)
Nominal  Tariff 3-digit  -0.134***  -0.12***
- . . (0.02)  (0.011)
Nominal  Tariff 4-digit  -0.234***  -0.116***
(0.015)  (0.011)
Industry effects  3-digit  Yes  Yes  Yes
N. observations  . 77423  77423  72651  72651  72651  45304  45304  42630  42630 R-squared  0.002  0.012  0.003  0.361  0.012  0.157  0.005  0.166  0.005
' The dependent variable -is plant productivity.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  **,  ** and * indicate significance at  1%, 5%  and  10%  levels, respectively.
All regressions include a constant. Plant age and age  squared are included in the regressions in columns (6)-(9). An increase  in RER represents  a real appreciation of
the Colombian  peso (IMF  definition).  In columns  (1)-(2), interactions  refer to 3-digit traded industries,  in columns  (3)-(5) they refer to 4-digit traded industries.  In
columns  (1)-(5), petroleum  derivatives and iron and steel  are excluded  due to  irregularities  in the  export  data  and the  omitted  category are  nontraded  industries.
Sample years included are  1980-1991  in columns (l)-(5) and  1981,  1984-1989 in columns (6)-(9).  One-period lagged tariff measures  are used.Table 6
Irnpact of Lagged Effective Rates of Protection and Import Penetration Ratios on Plant Produc-
tiVitya
Regressors  OLS  OLS  Plant  Plant
Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
ERP 34igit  0.004  0.004  0.023***  0.03***
(0.014)  (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.009)
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Industry effects 3-digit  Yes
Industry effects 4-digit  Yes  Yes
N. observations  32456  32456  32456  32456
R-squared  0;15  0.19  0.02  0.06
Regressors  OLS  OLS  Plant  Plant
Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects
(5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Import penetration ratio 34igit  1.797***  1.811***  0.601***  1.59***
(0.077)  (0.075)  (0.024)  (0.049)
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Industry effects  3-digit  Yes
Industry effects 44igit  Yes  Yes
N. observations  71928  71928  71928  71928
R-squared  0.15  0.19  0.02  0.05
Regressors  OLS  OLS  Plant  Plant
Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects
(9)  (10)  (11)  (12)
Import penetration ratio 4-digit  -0.034*  0.668***  0.335***  0.634***
(0.018)  (0.052)  (0.019)  (0.033)
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Industry effects 3-digit  Yes
Industry effects 4-digit  Yes  Yes
N. observations  67686  67686  67686  67686
R-squared  0.15  0.19  0.01  0.04
a  The dependent  variable is plant productivity.  Robust standard errors  are in parentheses.  ***,
** and * indicate significance at 1%,  5% and 10% levels, respectively.  All regressions  include
a constant,  plant  age and age  squared.  Sample years  included are  1980,  1984,  1985,  1990,
1991  in columns (1)-(4) and  1981-1991  in columns (5)-(12).  One-period lagged ERP measures
and import penetration ratios are used.
37Table 7
Impact of Lagged Tariffs on Plant Productivity Differentiated by Size'
Panel A  Size Measured by Plant Employment
Regressor  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Small  -0.163***  -0.02  -0.012  -0.122***  0.098***  -0.009
(0.007)  (0.017)  (0.024)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.023)
Large  0.172***  0.331***  0.318***  0.189***  0.399***  0.292***
(0.014)  (0.019)  (0.027)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.026)
Nominal  tariff 3-d. x Small  0.253***  -0.017  -0.013
(0.011)  (0.026)  (0.026)
Nominal tariff 3-d. x Large  -0.104***  -0.336***  -0.33***
(0.022)  (0.033)  (0.033)
Nominal tariff 4-d. x Small  0.154***  -0.171***  -0.025
(0.01)  (0.018)  (0.025)
Nominal tariff 4-d. x Large  -0.143***  -0.412***  -0.268***
(0.02)  (0.024)  (0.031)
Year effects  Small Large  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Industry effects 3-digit  Yes  Yes
Industry effects 4-digit  Yes  Yes
N. observations  57861  57861  57861  54501  54501  54501
R-squared  0.04  0.15  0.18  0.04  0.15  0.18
Panel B  Size Measured by Plant Market Share
Regressor  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Market share 3-digit  7.969***  9.968***  9.417***  7.333***  8.7***  7.84***
(0.54)  (0.503)  (0.47)  (0.439)  (0.392)  (0.404)
M. share squared  -11.06***  -12.32***  -11.13***  -10.41***  -11.14***  -9.92***
(0.834)  (0.959)  (0.865)  (0.789)  (0.911)  (0.855)
Nominal tariff 3-digit  0.193***  -0.084***  -0.08***
(0.01)  (0.026)  (0.026)
Nom.tariff3-d.  x M.share  -3.625***  -5.51***  -5.622***
(0.97)  (0.901)  (0.831)
Nominal tariff 4-digit  0.106***  -0.218***  -0.091***
(0.01)  (0.017)  (0.024)
Nom.tariff4-d.  x M.share  -2.636***  -3.172***  -2.378***
(0.841)  (0.792)  (0.802)
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Industry effects 3-digit  Yes  Yes
Industry effects 4-digit  Yes  Yes
N. observations  57861  57861  57861  54501  54501  54501
R-squared  0.04  0.15  0.18  0.04  0.16  0.18
Average  M. share 3-digit  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004
Average M.  share squared  0.0004  0.0004  0.0004  0.0004  0.0004  0.0004
Average Nom. tariff 3-digit  0.464  0.464  0.464
Average Nom. tariff 4-digit  0.477  0.477  0.477
a  The  dependent  variable  is  plant  productivity.  Robust  standard  errors  are  in  parentheses.  ***,  ** and  * indicate
significance  at 1%, 5% and  10%  levels, respectively.  In Panel A,  small plants have  less than  50 employees in their first
year in the sample.  In Panel B,  market shares are relative to 3-digit industry output in the plant's first year in the sample.
At the bottom of each column,  the regressors' sample averages  used to calculate  the corresponding  marginal  effects are
reported.  Sample years  included are 1977,  1979,  1981,  1984-1989.  One-period lagged tariff measures are used.
38Table 8
Impact of Lagged  Effective Rates of Protection and Import Penetration Ratios on Plant Productivity Differentiated b3
Size'
Panel A  Size Measured by Plant Ernployment
Regressor  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Small  -0.003  -0.065***  -0.096***  -0.164***  -0.006  -0.126***
(0.017)  (0.026)  (0.009)  (0.018)  (0.008)  (0.018)
Large  0.321***  0.232***  0.01  -0.056***  0.137***  0.006
(0.022)  (0.029)  (0.013)  (0.02)  (0.013)  (0.02)
ERP 3 digit x Small  0.058***  0.052***
(0.014)  (0.014)
ERP 3-digit xLarge  -0.14*  -0.121***
(0.017)  (0.017)
Import Penet.3-digit  x Small  1.516***  1.646***
(0.073)  (0.072)
Import Penet.3-digit x Large  2.241 ***  2.207***
(0.074)  (0.072)
Import Penet.4-digit x Small  -0.149***  0.585***
(0.019)  (0.05)
Import  Penet.4-digit x Large  0.14***  0.876***
(0.023)  (0.052)
Year effects Small Large  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Industry effects 3-digit  Yes  Yes  Yes
Industry effects 4-digit  Yes  Yes  Yes
N. observations  32456  32456  71928  71928  67686  67686
R-squared  0.19  0.23  0.19  0.23  0.18  0.22
Panel B  Size Measured  by Plant Market  Share
Regressor  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Market share 3-digit  11.22***  10.27***  8.738***  8.021***  9.039***  8.194***
(0.527)  (0.515)  (0.219).  (0.216)  (0.222)  (0.223)
M. share squared  -23.29***  -20.72***  -20.8***  -18.460**  -20.5***  -18.13***
(1.376)  (1.297)  (0.904)  (0.847)  (0.873)  (0.846)
ERP 3-digit  0.009  0.009
(0.014)  (0.013)
ERP 3-d.  x M.share  -1.757***  -1,529***
(0.501)  (0.481)
Import penet. 3-digit  1.774***  1.789***
(0.072)  (0.071)
Imp.penet.3-d.  x M.share  4.49***  4.238***
(0.596)  (0.54)
Import penet. 4-digit  0.011  0.672***
(0.018)  (0.049)
Imp.penet.4-d.  x M.share  3.211***  3.144***
(0.594)  (0.563)
Yeareffects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Industry effects 3-digit  Yes  Yes  Yes
Industry effects 4-digit  Yes  Yes  Yes
N. observations  32456  32456  71928  71928  67686  67686
R-squared  0.19  0.23  0.19  0.23  0.19  0.22
Average M. share 3-digit  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004
Average M. share squared  0.00036  0.00036  0.00037  0.00037  0.00037  0.00037
Average ERP 3-digit  0.871  0.871
Average Imp.  penet. 3-digit  0.123  0.123
Average Imp.  penet. 4-digit  0.115  0.115
The  dependent  variable  is plant productivity.  Robust  standard errors  are in parentheses.  *,  *  and  * indicate
significance at  1%,  5% and  10%  levels, respectively.  In Panel A, smaOl  plants have less than  50 employees  in their
first  year in  the sample.  In Panel  B,  market  shares  are  relative  to 3-digit  industry output in  their first year  in the
sample.  At  the  bottom  of  each  column  in  Panel  B,  the  regressors'  sample  averages  used  to  calculate  the
corresponding  marginal  effects are reported.  Sample  years  included are  1980,  1984,  1985,  1990,  1991  in Panels A
and B,  columns (l)-(2) and  1981-1991  in Panels A and  B, columns  (3)-(6).  One-period  lagged ERP measures and
import penetration ratios are used.
39Table 9
Impact of Lagged Tariffi on Plant Productivity Differentiated by Degree of Domestic Competitiona
Regressor  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Herfindahl  Index 3-digit  -0.786***  -0.598***
(0.102)  (0.101)
Nominal tariff  3-digit  0.114***  0.105***  -0.115***  -0.799***
(0.013)  (0.012)  (0.027)  (0.042)
Nom.tariff3-d.  x Herfindahl 3-d.  -0.781***
(0.259)
Nominal tariff 4-digit  0.06***  0.012  -0.313***  -0.939***
(0.013)  (0.013)  (0.02)  (0.038)
Nom.tariff4-d.  x Herfindahl 3-d.  -1.441***
(0.242)
Herfindahl  Index 4-d.  -0.282***  -0.218***  -0.339***  -0.227***
(0.054)  (0.063)  (0.065)  (0.075)
Nom.tariff3-d. x Herfindahl 4-d.  0.161  0.532***
(0.119)  (0.144)
Nom.tariff4-d.  x Herfindahl 4-d.  -0.131  0.406***
(0.129)  (0.142)
Turnover rate 3-digit  -1.115***  -1.127***
(0.067)  (0.068)
Nominal tariff 3-d.  x Turnover  3-d.  3.122***
(0.143)
Nominal tariff 4-d.  x Turnover  3-d.  3.363***
(0.135)
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Industry effects  3-digit  Yes  Yes
N. observations  57861  54501  57861  57861  54501  54501  57861  54501
R-squared  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.34  0.01  0.12  0.02  0.02
Average Herf.  Index 3-digit  0.045  0.045
Average Herf. Index 4-digit  0.088  0.088  0.082  0.082
Average Turn. rate 3-digit  25.66  25.78
Average  Nom. tariff 3-digit  0.464  0.464  0.464  0.464
Average  Nom. tariff 4-digit  I  0.477  0.477  0.477  0.477
a The dependent variable  is plant productivity.  Robust  standard errors  are in parentheses.  *  ** and  * indicate  significance  at  1%, 5%  and  10% levels,
respectively.  Herfindahl indexes  for  1977  are used,  defined as  the sum of squared market  shares of plants relative to industry output. Turnover  rates  for
1977-1978  are used, defined as the sum of entry and exit rates into 3-digit industries. At the bottom of each column,  the regressors' sample averages  used
to calculate the corresponding  marginal  effects  are reported.  Sample  years included are  1977,  1979,  1981,  1984-1989.  One-period lagged tariff measures
are used.Table  10  Impact of Lagged Effective  Rates of Protection and Import Penetration on Plant Productivity Differentiated by Degree of Domestic Competition
Regre§sor  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)
Herfindahl Index 3-digit  -1.346***  -1.532***  -2.003**
(0.147)  (0.071)  (0.064)
ERP3-digit  0.066***  0.138***  0.011  -0.095***
(0.009)  (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.018)
ERP3d  x Herf.3-d.  0.748***
(0.187)
Import penet. 3-digit  -0.036**  -0.05**  1.633***  0.949*0*
(0.015)  (0.016)  (0.081)  (0.033)
Imp.penet.3-d.  x Herf.3-d.  2.239***
(0.2 17)
Import penet. 4-digit  -0.165***  -0.15***  -0.094***  0.6720*
(0.012)  (0.014)  (0.025)  (0.029)
Imp.penet 4-d. x Herf.3-d.  3.538***
(0.178)
Herfindahl lndex 4-digit  0.09  0.14***  -0.449***  -0.115***  -0.693+**  -0.135***
(0.055)  (0.06)  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.031)  (0.036)
ERP3d  xHerf.4-d.  -0.348***  -0.137***
(0.06)  (0.063)
Imp.penet.3-d.  x Herf.4-d.  1.014***  1.117e*
(0.122)  (0.178)
Imp.penet.44  x Herf.4-d.  1.32***  0.465***
(0.109)  (0.122)
Turnover  3-digit  -0.239***  1.077***  0.916***
(0.077)  (0.025)  (0.024)
ERP3-d. x Tun.3-digit  0.841**
(0.079)
Imp.penet.3-d.  x Turn.3-d.  -5.156 **
(0.211)
Imp.penet.4-d.  x Turn.3-d.  4.226***
(0.186)
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Industry effects 3-digit  Yes  Yes  Yes
N. observations  32456  32456  32456  32456  71928  67686  71928  71928  67686  67686  71928  67686
R-squared  0.02  0.02  0.15  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.15  0.01  0.15  0.03  0.02
Average  Herf. Index 3-digit  0.044  0.043  0.043
Average Herf. Index 4-digit  0.084  0.084  0.085  0.085  0.077  0.077
Average Turn, rate 3 -digit  0.198  0.224  0.227
Average ERP 3-digit  0.871  0.871  0.871  0.871
Average Imp. penet. 3-digit  0.123  0.123  0.123  0.123
Average Imp. penet. 4-digit  0.115  0.115  0.115  0.115
*The dependent variable is plant productivity. Robust standard errors are inparentheses.  *  , **  and * indicate significance  at 1%, 5% and  10% levels, respectively. Herfindahl indexes for
1980 are used  in columns  (1)-(4) and for  1981 in columns (5)-(12). Turnover rates for  1980-1981  are used in columns (1)-(4) and for  1981-1982 in columns (5)-(12).  At the bottom of each
column, the regressors'  sample averages used to calculate  the corresponding  marginal effects  are reported.  Sample years included  are 1980,  1984, 1985,  1990,  1991  in column  (1)-(4)  and
1981-1991  in columns  (5)-(12). One-period lagged ERP measures  and import penetrationratios  are used..19.
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